Learning Processes in Political Economy and Financial Markets by Merz, Christian
Learning Processes in Political
Economy
and Financial Markets
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2004
vorgelegt von
Christian Michael Merz
Referent: Prof. Sven Rady, Ph.D.
Koreferent: Prof. Stephan Klasen, Ph.D.
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 9. Februar 2005
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my supervisor Sven Rady for his support, helpful comments and
discussions during my Ph.D. studies at the Seminar for Dynamic Modelling. Also
I want to thank all colleagues and fellow students for interesting discussions during
seminars, conferences and coee-breaks. Special thanks go to my family, my girl-
friend and to numerous friends and acquaintances in and outside Munich, who made
this a really great time and gave me manifold moral support and opportunities to
recover from hard research-days during travels, mountain-trips, parties or simply in
the famous Grandma-Cafe next to the university. I owe all of you a beer or two!
Contents
Preface 1
1 Learning in Political Economy: A Game Theoretical Model to Ex-
plain Corruption in Unstable Economies 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The Notion of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Model Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Impact of Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 A Cross-Country Study on Economic Stability and Corruption 26
2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Regressions on Whole Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Regressions Dierentiating by Level of Democratization . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Learning in Financial Markets: A Model of Asset Pricing with Het-
erogeneous Agents 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1.1 Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.2 Learning and Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
I
CONTENTS II
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.2 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.3 Non-Strategic Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.4 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.5 Belief Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.1 Demand and Asset Price Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.2 Existence of Bubbles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Numerical Simulation of Price Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.1 The One Shock Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4 An Extended Model of Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents 76
4.1 The Multi Shock Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Strategic Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2.2 Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Myopic Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Dynamic Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 Excess Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Outlook and Testable Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Epilogue 91
Appendix 92
A Technical Appendix of Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B Data used in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C Appendix of Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D Appendix of Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Bibliography 103
Preface
While the title of this dissertation is "Learning processes in political economy
and nancial markets" it could as well be "Learning in classical and behavioral eco-
nomics" as the work presented not only covers dierent elds of application but also
faces classical learning concepts in economics with an innovative and less conventional
approach to this topic.
The importance of learning as a key characteristic of human behavior and the base
for proper decision making is seldom denied among economists nowadays. However,
the process of learning was a "black box" for a long time in the eld of economic re-
search. The focus was not on learning itself but on its outcome and its consequences,
namely the perfect rational behavior that is usually assumed when describing de-
cision processes of economic actors. Learning was treated as some sort of passive
adjustment, i.e. it was assumed that actors adapt perfect and immediately to new
circumstances without any frictions or delay.1
In recent years more and more economists investigated the process of learning itself
in economic environments.2 The main areas of research in economic learning the-
ory are rational equilibrium models and game theory.3 A newer and less conventional
1For a broad discussion of this topic see Arrow (1987), Lucas (1987), Winter (1987) and Witt
(1992).
2Kirman and Salmon (1995) provide a general overview of research on learning in economic
theory.
3"Social learning" is another eld that could be distinguished. It is based on both, game the-
ory and rational expectations, and has developed new concepts like "herding" and "informational
cascades" etc. See Vives (1996) for more details on social learning.
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approach to learning in economic settings is done in the eld of behavioral economics.
Rational equilibrium learning models work on the basis of statistical methods
where agents update their beliefs about an uncertain environment based on obser-
vations they make and signals they receive. It is assumed that economic subjects
have exact information about probability distributions of uncertain events, they in-
terpret signals right and they have sucient calculation capabilities to perform even
complex updating tasks correctly. The common adjustment or updating mechanism
is Bayesian learning. Learning in this sense is the addition of new information to a
former set of knowledge and the adjustment of the agents best decision to this joint
set of information using utility maximization concepts. The abilities to process the
information and to calculate optimal results are assumed to be given from the begin-
ning and are not changed over time. Thus the agents work in a mechanistic way and
no deviations from optimal behavior are allowed.
Game Theory builds on rational learning but adds various additional mechanisms
to develop more sophisticated equilibrium concepts and to cope with multiple equi-
libria, a common problem when dealing with rational equilibrium models. The rene-
ment of equilibria allows for more precise results but requires additional assumptions
on the behavior, the interactions and the potential errors agents make.4
The strength of game theory and the rational equilibrium concept clearly lies in
its relative homogeneity and perhaps more important in the precision and the deter-
mination of its results. More than that they have often been successfully applied to
observed economic phenomena and were able to unify problems from very dierent
areas within the roof of one theoretical framework. One example of applied game
theory is political economy and we will present a classical learning model in this area
in Chapter 1.
The other side of the medal is than economists internalized the rationality con-
cept and its assumptions so deeply that some became unaware of phenomena where
4Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide an overview of game theoretic concepts.
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the concept of rational equilibria might not be the best solution or where behavior
obviously is driven by other forces. Psychology, for instance, mentions many forces
that inuence human behavior besides rationality but most of them were persistently
ignored, maybe because they are hard to grasp theoretically or because some of them
are contradictory in their nature.
Anyhow there is an increasing number of facts from real life observations and ex-
perimental results that cannot be explained satisfactory by standard economic theory.
Especially when looking for the micro foundation of large scale economic phenomena
there seems to be no way around regarding actual individual behavior even if it dif-
fers from perfect rational behavior. This is where the growing discipline of behavioral
economics steps in and tries to explain human decision making at the border line of
rational economic choice and psychological evidence.5 Behavioral economics tries to
set up experiments where the decision making of human actors is tracked in more
or less realistic situations and identies deviations from the predictions of classical
theory. The theoretical line of behavioral economics then develops new methods or
changes assumptions in order to describe observed phenomena more precisely.
In the case of learning models, behavioral economics attempts to view learning as
a more complex process than classical concepts. Instead of focussing on the outcome
of perfect rational behavior it allows for all kinds of individual misinterpretation of
information, suboptimal decision making or inconsistencies in behavior as long as
there is enough evidence for them from either psychological research or economic
experiments and observations.6 Specically, even heterogeneity and progress in infor-
mation processing capabilities are allowed and we will draw on real life evidence of
this phenomena when building up a behavioral learning model in Chapter 3.
While keeping a closer eye to the whole spectrum of human behavior and attempt-
ing to be more rigid with assumptions that are normally made without a thought,
behavioral economics has its caveats too. The most important one is probably the
5In Section 3.1, 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we will describe the dierent approaches in the application case
of nancial markets more detailed.
6See Slembeck (1997) for a review of learning in behavioral economics.
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lack of a unifying framework which makes behavioral economics harder to grasp and
less easy to set up rules to deal with a given problem. Some facets of human behavior
- as behavioral economics sees it - seem to be arbitrary (or so complex that they look
arbitrary to an observer) to a certain degree. This makes it hard to formulate precise
mathematical models as economists are used to, and even harder to formulate them
in such a way that they are compatible to standard economics.
Today, it seems to be still unclear whether the more reality-based behavioral ap-
proach or the theoretically sophisticated traditional concepts will prevail in economic
research, or if it will be possible to combine both of them in a meaningful way.
In the following we will confront the dieren approaches to learning in economics.
Therefore we present two applications of both of the mentioned learning concepts in
two theoretical models in political economy and nancial markets. Additionally we
present an empirical study that was performed in order to conrm predictions made
from the rst of our models.
Thus, Chapter 1 sets up a game theoretic model in a political competition frame-
work where agents learn by observing signals of economic outcome and politicians
can hide corrupt activities behind exogenous shocks to growth. Chapter 2 provides
an empirical cross-country study on the theoretical results of chapter 1. Chapter 3
follows the behavioral branch of learning theories. A model is set up where agents
improve their quality of decision making and we show that asset pricing bubbles and
other frequently observed nancial markets phenomena can be explained within this
setup. Chapter 4 extends the model of Chapter 3 to a dynamic setting and to more
general price paths.
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Learning in Political Economy: A
Game Theoretical Model to Explain
Corruption in Unstable Economies
In this chapter we stick to a classical "learning"-model. Agents use Bayesian
updating in a political economy framework to gain information about politicians.
We describe how the level of corruption can be linked to the economic stability of a
country independent of the actual hight of the country's GDP.
1.1 Introduction
There is almost no country which has not been hit by some sort of corruption
at some time of its history. Even today, where corruption no longer appears to
play a mayor role in western economies, no one would claim that it has been totally
defeated. For developing and transition countries things are much worse. Corruption
is more pervasive there and in some countries it is blamed for having a severe negative
impact on economic activity. This impact of corruption on growth and stability is
widely studied in the literature but as far as we know there is little work yet in the
opposite direction, i.e. in examining the inuence of the economic (in)stability of a
country on the level of corruption.
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In this chapter we present a model addressing this gap. Therefore we set up
a two-period model of political competition with asymmetric information and two
types of politicians, where incumbents have to decide about the level of corruption
and economic output is aected by their decision. We will show that in a Bayesian
equilibrium, the incumbent chooses a higher level of corruption if the variance of
economic output is high and a lower level if it is low. Also we will show that high
levels of corruption are more likely if regular legal remunerations for being in oce
are low. Thus we conclude that a high level of economic instability should foster
corruption and we present an empirical test of our suggestions in Chapter 2.
This chapter is organized as follows: First we take a look at the related literature
to dene the notion of corruption and to track alternative explanations for the ap-
pearance of corruption. Then we present the model in Section 1.3 and work through
the game and the propositions. A conclusion and an outlook are following paper and
a variation of the model is discussed in Appendix A. In Chapter 2 the theoretical
model is tested in a cross-country study.
1.2 The Notion of Corruption
Corruption is a more or less prevalent phenomenon in any society that runs a po-
litical apparatus to control the allocation and distribution of limited resources, rights
and claims within its economic system. Whenever the control of public decision mak-
ers by the society either by direct observation or by moral norms is not absolute, there
is room for the former to behave opportunistically and to take inecient or unjust
decisions in exchange for payments or other grants from the privileged parties. The
sum of this socially undesirable behavior is what we call corruption in our paper.
To get a better understanding of the types of corruption and how they might lead
to inecient outcomes, we follow Rose-Ackerman (1999) and distinguish ve genres
of corruption:
1. Bribes to equate dierences in supply and demand stemming from legal restric-
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tions: In this case bribes raise the price of a good in excess demand and with xed
supply until demand is lowered to the available amount of supply. Therefore some
rents are transferred and pocketed by the corrupt ocial. Ineciency occurs if the
considered party is dierent from the one with the highest valuation.
2. Bribes as incentive payments are payed when it depends on the goodwill of
ocials whether demanded work is done fast or slow ("speed money"). Alternatively
bribes may be payed to slow down the work of ocials concerning competitors. The
second case is sometimes even more "eective" for the bribing party, as it is often
easier for an ocial to slow down a process than to accelerate it. Ineciency results
from wrong incentives and the creation of additional "road blocks" by ocers to
increase their veto power.
3. Bribes to lower costs. This means that an ocial is payed to be indulgent when
controlling for example safety standards. The ineciency might result from ignoring
external eects that have been internalized by laws.
4. Bribes to obtain limited concessions which otherwise would have been sold in
an auction or a beauty contest. This leads to misallocation if not all parties have the
same readiness to bribe. Otherwise the result would be the same as in an auction,
but rents would go to the ocial and not to the state.
5. Bribes to buy political inuence and votes. Here lobbies pay bribes to politi-
cians so as to strengthen their position. In a broader way one could also put politi-
cians' favors to special interest groups in exchange for votes or campaign contributions
into this category.
Whereas probably hardly anybody doubted the negative eects of corruption in
practice, from a theoretical point of view it was not clear for a long time whether cor-
ruption is really that distortionary. Some economists (see for example Le (1964) or
Huntington (1968) ) even defended the use of bribery as an ecient, welfare enhanc-
ing mechanism. The rst argument was that bribes provide a motivation for ocers
to work harder in so far as they act at a piece rate. They also claimed that "speed
money" avoids bureaucratic delays and bribes for concessions work as an auction-like
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allocation device, where scarce resources are given to the parties with the highest
valuation and thus the highest bribe oer. According to this school bribes should
not have more negative eects on the economy than other transfers, for example
taxes. Interesting as it is, this theory falls short of the fact that the access to such a
bribe-driven market could very likely dier for various demanding parties either for
dierences in moral considerations or for dierent levels of trustworthiness, connec-
tions to ocers and available information. It also ignores the negative incentives for
ocers induced by corruption, as they might try to strengthen their position by set-
ting up additional hurdles. From a contract-theoretic perspective, bribe "contracts"
have the disadvantage of not being enforceable by the trade partners.
Shleifer and Vishny argue that corruption is more costly than taxation because of
the secrecy premise, i.e. the necessity to hide away corrupt activities from the public
and the law. The secrecy premise thus allocates resources for setting up and cov-
ering secure information channels (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). Other empirical
and theoretical studies as from the United Nations (1989) or from Klitgaard (1991)
conrm the suspicion that corruption is a wasteful activity and should be banned
wherever possible. Another implication of Le and Huntington's theory is that cor-
ruption should especially exert its pretended positive eect in inecient bureaucratic
environments. This argument can be cancelled out by a empirical study by Mauro
(1995), who shows that the correlation between growth and corruption is far from
being signicantly dierent in countries with highly ecient and with less ecient
bureaucracies, whereas according to Le and Huntington growth should be closer cor-
related to corruption in less ecient bureaucracies, because they should work better
with the "help" of corruption. In our work we stick to the view of corruption as a
"bad" activity, as we refer to a negative eect of corruption on economic output in a
common way.
In the terms of informational economics, corruption could be seen as a principal-
agent-problem with the society as the principal and the politicians and ocers as the
agents. Under asymmetric information about the agents' actions there is no way to
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provide perfect incentives without handing over the entire surplus to them. Fixed
remunerations and benets given, only transparency and monitoring (reduction of
asymmetry), means of punishment (deterrence), or some "moral codex" (altering of
the agent's utility function) can reduce the level of corruption.
All points play an important role in the determination of the levels of corruption
observed in reality. For example the means of control should be higher in societies with
a high level of democracy and free media than in autocratic countries with suppressed
media. Also the society in autocratic systems has fewer possibilities to punish decision
makers than in democracies. The model of Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) addresses
this point and thus claims that corruption should be higher in autocratic systems.
But even in the most autocratic society the people has a possibility to discipline
the government - for example by threatening a revolution (see Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000)). Of course this threat is quite poor and probably less eective than the
possible sanctions in a democratic country. Still it may play a role in the behavior of
corrupt decision makers in autocratic countries and could well bound away the level of
corruption from the maximum level. And as the level of corruption diers widely both
among autocratic and among democratic countries, the degree of democratization
cannot be the sole determinant of corruption.
The last point, the dierences in moral norms, certainly also plays an important
role in the explanation of corruption. Some even consider it to be the main reason
for the degree of corruption and claim that the eects of dierent constitutional and
economic circumstances are negligible compared to those of dierent social norms.
Bardhan (1997) gives an example of the dierent views of corruption by Westerners
and Asians. The former perceive the regular "baksheesh" payments in Asian countries
as corrupt, whereas the latter nd the high degree of monetarization even in personal
transactions in western countries corrupt. The dierences could be explained by the
comparatively high level of individualization in western societies and by the long
tradition of mutual gift exchange at all levels of society in many Asian countries.
Even if they sound somewhat tautological, it has to be admitted that explanations
related to cultural dierences are capable to explain dierences in the level of corrup-
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tion even within one country or society, for example between northern and southern
Italy. Other theories and examples of this type are provided by Putnam (1993) for
Italy, by Yang (1989) for the Chinese society and by many others.
However, in our opinion cultural dierences rather enforce existing tendencies of
corruption stemming from the principal-agent-relationship, than being the sole source
of it. An argument supporting this view is that there are many counter-examples
where culturally related areas show huge dierences in the level of corruption (e.g.
Singapore compared to Malaysia or Indonesia, or many examples where corruption
diers between urban and rural areas within one culturally homogeneous region).
Because corruption seems to be much more common in developing and poor coun-
tries, many studies concentrated on the connection of corruption to growth or to
wealth. It is argued that economies with low output and slow growth are more sus-
ceptible to corruption because the controlling power of the executive is weak and
people on all levels of societies are in great need for extra incomes.
Paldam (2002) ran a number of cross-country regressions and found empirical
evidence for the inuence of GDP per capita on corruption levels, though in the same
paper he argues that the correlation is more a trend than of precise forecasting value.
Detailed ideas concerning the corruption-growth relationship are highlighted by
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) or by DelMonte and Papagani (2001). Mauro (1995) looks
for empirical evidence in this direction, and nds a negative association between
perceived corruption and the investment rate in a cross-country study. The intuition
is that it is expensive and risky to invest in highly corrupt countries, and therefore
growth should be low, whereas the resulting poverty fosters corruption even further
and so on.
But on the other hand, Bardhan (1997) points out that it cannot simply be inferred
that low economic growth is the only source for corruption, as there are many cases
where corruption is rising sharply although growth is relatively high and incomes are
rising. Many of the eastern European transition economies as well as some south-east
Asian states fall into this category.
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These examples also contradict the argument of many liberal economists that
corruption is spawned by regulatory states because the level of corruption increased
substantially after market reforms in recent years for example in post-communist
Russia or China.
Other models stress the idea that corruption shows a sort of a reinforcing eect,
i.e. that it pays more to be corrupt when everybody else is. Thus corruption is
expected to spread fast once a certain critical level is reached and on the other hand
it should be dicult to introduce corruption in an extremely "clean" country. For
example Andvig and Moene (1990) come to this result in their model by pointing out
that for a corrupt ocer it is cheaper to get detected by a corrupt superior than by
a clean one. Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994) support this view of corruption as a
collective action problem with the results of another model.
The intuition of this theory is quite appealing as it is easy to imagine that a newly
installed and so far innocent ocer in Bangladesh is more likely to accept a bribe
than one in Finland. Nevertheless it fails in describing how the level of corruption
was able to reach this critical point in some countries and not in others.
To summarize, there are some interesting and plausible approaches to the phe-
nomenon of corruption, most of them addressing cultural, constitutional or economic
dierences between countries and some of them relating growth and wealth to the
level of corruption. Yet none of the theories can fully explain corruption and, as far
as we know, none examined the relationship between economic (in)stability and cor-
ruption. Our model wants to address this gap and show why it is plausible to think
of economic instability as a possible additional source of corruption.
To investigate this issue we dene stability as the amplitude of economic output
growth around a long term drift rate. A country with a low variance of output growth
(i.e. a relatively monotone output path) is called stable, one with a high variance (i.e.
a relatively non-monotonic output path) is called unstable. We show that instability
in economic growth can hamper the electorate in learning the politicians true type and
11
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allow them to behave in a less social way. The stability of output enters exogenously in
our model, and one can think of it as being an eect of the state of the world economy,
exchange rates, foreign relationships, prices of raw materials, internal frictions from
reorganization processes, natural disasters and the like. The idea of output stability
being exogenous is supported by a paper of Easterly et al. (1993), where they nd
that most of the variation in growth rates is due to random shocks and not to some
special policy.
1.3 The Model
We use a two period political competition model where an incumbent can decide
on the level of corruption and faces some elections1 at the end of the rst period.
1.3.1 Model Structure
There are two periods t = 1 and t = 2 and two possible levels of corruption in each
period, lt ∈ {l, l̄}. The normalization lt = l = 0 means there will be "no corruption"
in period t and lt = l̄ > 0 means that a high level of corruption is chosen in period t.2
1Basically the instrument of election is only a democratic device to discipline politicians. If
one thinks about the threat of revolution being a disciplining device in autocratic countries, as
mentioned above, one can expand our model even to non-democratic countries. The "election"
there would be the decision whether to revolt or not. Of course the disciplining eect of a threat
of revolution should be small due to the high private costs of such a revolution, but in a dierent
context Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) show how this threat can suce to cause the ruling elite
of an autocratic country to extend the franchise in order to calm the people. Similarly the ruling
class might restrict corruption in our model to keep the people quiet. In Chapter 2 it is shown how
the level of democracy inuences the eects we show and it will come out that they are stronger in
democratic countries but not negligible in non-democratic ones.
2The level of corruption chosen can be thought of as the degree of the incumbent being corrupt
himself or allowing his subordinate ocers to be corrupt. If an incumbent decides to turn a blind eye
on corruption in the governmental apparatus he will benet from this by getting stronger support
by his ocers. In the other case, when he decides on low corruption he will not only lose the direct
income of corruption, but his life will get harder because it is likely that support from his ocers
12
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Denition of Players
There are two types of politicians, a "good" one (θ = g) and a "bad" one (θ = b).
The overall utility function of politicians is
UP = τ1(u0 + aθl1) + τ2δ(u0 + aθl2) (1.1)
τt indicates whether P is in oce in period t (τt = 1) or not (τt = 0). u0 is the
"base" utility or ego-rent of being in oce, i.e. the salary, social status and so on.
This utility is xed and cashed in for certain in every period the politician is in oce.
The "good" politician derives negative utility from being corrupt, as he might feel
guilty or fear punishment, i.e. he will stick to his promise not to be corrupt. The
bad politician does not care about external eects or morality considerations and gets
direct positive utility from a high level of corruption. In the model this is expressed
by ag < 0 and ab > 0. ag and ab denote the gains-factor from corruption for good
respectively bad politicians.
All politicians are drawn from a large pool of politicians, where π is the fraction of
"good" politicians in this pool. Future utility is discounted by δ.
The incumbent I of period 1 has to decide on the level of corruption l1 in period
1 and on the level of corruption l2 in period 2 for the case that he gets reelected.
Citizens derive utility UV only from the performance of the economy, which is
measured by economic output e. It is assumed that they all have strictly monotonic
utility functions in output, so UV (e′) > UV (e) ⇔ e′ > e. Thus, citizens can be
modeled by a representative voter V with utility function UV . The only action the
representative citizen takes is to vote at the end of period 1. Then, V can decide
is lower when they experience stricter controls of their actions. Therefore in this model only the
decision of the incumbent is considered and the ocers are supposed to follow the decision of the
government.
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whether to conrm I in oce or to elect a challenger C.
C is the challenger that is drawn out of the pool of politicians to face I in the
election. If he gets elected he will be in oce in period 2, therefore his only action is
to set a level of corruption in period 2 if he is elected.
Economic Stability
The economic output denes the voter's utility and is crucial as a signal about
I's policy in period 1. The voter observes the change in economic output directly
by comparing his utility at the beginning and at the end of period 1. However, the
change in economic output is aected by three factors. First, there is a drift rate d
determining the long term growth rate of the economy. d is of no importance for the
theoretical model itself but nevertheless we keep it for the empirical part in Chapter
2. Second, there is an exogenous shock s to the economy. s brings in the variance to
output. Third, we assume a negative impact of corruption on the performance of the
economy. Therefore the change in economic output e is modeled as follows:
∆e = d + s− l (1.2)
s has mean zero and is distributed with one of two possible density functions h(·)
which have either high or low variance, where high and low variance of s are equally
likely. For the computation of the equilibrium we assume h(a, b) to be a uniform
distribution on the interval [a; b] in the remainder of the model:3
s ∼ h(−ẽ, +ẽ) with ẽ ∈ {e, ē}, p(ẽ = e) = p(ẽ = ē) = 1
2
(1.3)
ẽ = e stands for a relatively "stable" economy, i.e. shocks are comparatively small,
whereas ẽ = ē denotes an "unstable" economy which suers large shocks to economic
3In appendix A, a version of the model with a more natural normally distributed shock to
economic output is discussed. Unfortunately this leads to some computational problems due to the
characteristics of the normal distribution function.
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outcome. Think of a stable economy for example as a well diversied one, whereas
an unstable economy could be a country highly dependent on one export good with
large price uctuations. We assume that l̄ < 2e, i.e. the inuence of the exogenous
shock on the economy is not too small compared to the inuence of corruption.
Information Structure
There are two types of uncertainty which the citizen is facing when making his
electoral decision:
First, the level of l1 chosen by I cannot be directly observed by the citizen. It is
assumed that corruption mostly takes place between government and only a few of
the citizens in special positions, e.g. rm managers, lobbyists etc. Therefore the great
majority does not know whether much or little corruptive activity is executed by the
government. However politicians and citizens observe ẽ at the beginning of period 1,
as they know whether they live in a "stable" or "unstable" economy. Thus citizens
know the maximum amplitude of the shock s, but they do not know its actual size.
Also citizens naturally can observe their own utility after e incarnates. Uncertain of
the origin of an income shock, they only can calculate probabilities for the chosen size
of l1. Thus e acts as a noisy signal about the action of I.
Second, the types of I and C are not known a priori, but both have an initial
reputation of being of "good" type denoted by αI and αC , i.e. αi = p(θ(i) = g),
i ∈ {I, C}. αI and αC are independent of actual types and are drawn from the same
cumulative distribution function F . F is common knowledge.
The Game
The players of the game are the incumbent, the representative citizen and the
challenger. The timing of the game is as follows:
First, nature chooses the type of the incumbent θ(I), which is only observed by the
incumbent I. Then, nature chooses ẽ, which is observed by all players. Now, I must
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choose l1, and nobody except herself knows her choice. Nature then draws s with
p(s = x) = h(x) and s − l1 is computed as the net output, as we set d = 0 in the
theoretical model. s− l1 is observed by all players.
After the citizen and the incumbent receive their rst-period utilities, an election is
held, and the former has to choose between the incumbent I and the challenger C
based on his beliefs about θ(I) and on αC . C is drawn by nature from the pool
of politicians (and only himself knows his type) and as mentioned above his initial
reputation is drawn from F .
The winner of the election then chooses the second period l2. Finally second-period
payos are realized and the game ends. A timeline of the game can be found in Figure
1.1.
Draw
eI ~)( and
 
I chooses l1 Winner
chooses l2
2nd period
payoffs
Game ends
1 2
Draw s
e calculated
and observed 
by all players
1st period
payoffs
V forms I

Draw
V chooses
between I and
C in election 
Cand 

)(C
Figure 1.1: Game Timing
A strategy for the incumbent is the pair l := (l1, l2) of decision rules about the
degree of corruption in the rst and (if reelected) the second period. I's choice is
dependent on her type θ(I) and the state of the world ẽ.
A strategy for the challenger is the decision rule l2 if he is elected for the second
period. His choice is dependent only on his type θ(C).
A strategy for the citizen is the voting decision rule v that species whether he votes
for I (v = I) or C (v = C). The choice is dependent on his beliefs βI(e) about the
incumbent's type after observing her initial reputation αI and the signal e and on the
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challenger's initial reputation αC . V compares αC and βI and chooses the candidate
with the higher value. Thus the probability for I to get reelected is F (βI).
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a set of optimal strategies for I, C
and V and of consistent beliefs of the citizen about I's type.
It must satisfy the following properties:
• I chooses l such that l(θ(I)) = argmaxlEUP
• C chooses l2 such that l2(θ(C)) = argmaxl2(u0 + aθl2)
• V chooses a voting rule v such that v = argmaxvEUV where V 's second period
utility is dependent on the type of the elected politician v
• V 's posterior belief about I's type after observing the signal e, βI(e) = p(θ(I) =
g | e) is derived by updating using Bayes' rule and is consistent
1.3.2 Equilibrium
As we face a two period game, we can solve it by backward induction.
Proposition 1.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as dened above, a "good" in-
cumbent chooses l2 = l, a "bad" one l2 = l.
Proof
In the second period the behavior of the politician in power is clear. She does
not have to worry about being reelected and will simply maximize her second period
utility u0 + aθl2. This leads to l2 = l for a < 0 ("good" politician in power) and to
l2 = l for a > 0 ("bad" politician in power).4
2
4Here we have an endgame eect, which allows us to solve the game by backward induction.
However this assumption is not too unrealistic. First, many countries restrict the time for higher
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In the rst period, a "good" incumbent maximizes her expected utility. Her
behavior will obviously depend on citizens' beliefs.
In order to rule out equilibria based on unnatural out-of-equilibrium beliefs, such as
"a low level of e indicates a low l1" which could lead to self-fullling equilibria where
even good politicians play l1 = l, we concentrate on equilibria with monotonic beliefs
of citizens. This renement was rst used by Coate and Morris (1995) for situations
where other renements such as the equilibrium dominance argument by Cho and
Kreps (1987) cannot be applied because of the noisy character of the signal. Basically
it means that a higher economic output is believed to be produced more likely by
a "good" politician and thus l1 = 0 with a higher probability as if a low economic
output is observed. Formally: e′ > e ⇒ β(e′) ≥ β(e), other things held constant. This
concept sounds rather plausible in our case, as citizens know about "bad" politician's
preferences and their negative impact on output. For further discussion see Coate
and Morris (1995).
Proposition 1.2 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with monotonic beliefs as dened
above, a "good" incumbent chooses l1 = l.
Proof
Under the assumption of monotonic beliefs both the direct utility from engaging
in corruption decreases because ag < 0, and the chance of getting reelected is non-
increasing, thus the "good" incumbent will choose l1 = l.
2
Foreseeing this, citizens prefer to have a good politician in oce in the second
period, which would result in a higher expected level of e. Therefore they will vote
politicians to be in oce, and second every politician faces a limited lifespan and an increasing
probability of dying in each period, which should lead to the same results in a multi period game.
Empirically it would be interesting to test whether corruption activities rise the closer incumbents
get to their last possible period in oce, in which - as in our 2nd period - they do not have to care
about reelections anymore.
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for the candidate whom they consider to be good with a higher probability, thus
v = I ⇔ βI(e) ≥ αC . Starting from their prior belief αI they form βI(e) as follows:
βI(e) =
αIp(s− l = e | θ(I) = g)
αIp(s− l = e|θ(I) = g) + (1− αI)p(s− l = e|θ(I) = b) (1.4)
=
αIhl(e)
αIhl(e) + (1− αI)hl(e)
(1.5)
where hl(e) is the density function of e if l1 = l and hl(e) is the density for e if l1 = l.
hl(e) and hl(e) are similar to the distribution function h of s but shifted by l resp. l
to the left. For the case of uniformly distributed s this leads to
βI(e) =



0 if e ∈ [−ẽ− l; ẽ[ ,
αI if e ∈ [−ẽ; ẽ− l] ,
1 if e ∈]ẽ− l; ẽ] .
(1.6)
In this case there is either no learning or full revelation of I's type.5 For e < −ẽ− l
and e > ẽ beliefs are not dened but these cases cannot occur in the model, so this
beliefs can be set to any value.6
The incumbent's rst period behavior is determined by the maximization of I's
overall expected utility which in turn depends both on I's choice of l1 and on the
citizen's belief. For a "good" incumbent it was easy to show that l1 = l under
monotonic beliefs, as both direct utility and the probability of getting reelected are
decreasing in l1. For the case of being "bad", I has to make a tradeo between
increasing his income in the rst period by choosing l1 = l as ab > 0 and maximizing
the probability of being reelected to get in favor of second period incomes by choosing
l1 = l. To nd his actual behavior, we have to maximize overall expected utility as
5Again, see the appendix for a case with imperfect revelation of types. Anyway, this is only a
matter of "elegance", as uniformly distributed shocks perfectly suce to describe the eect under
consideration.
6Note that the citizens can only punish the incumbent by voting her out of oce and deprive her
of second period benets. However, if they could punish her arbitrarily hard, it would be possible to
implement the rst best, as there are cases where V can be sure that he is facing a bad politician.
19
Chapter 1
stated in equation 1.1, given that the citizen updates his beliefs according to equation
1.6.
If I's decision is l1 = l for θ(I) = b, then we are in a pooling equilibrium, where
behavior does not depend on I's type, if I's decision is l1 = l̄ for θ(I) = b, we are in a
separating equilibrium, where the good politician stays clean and the bad one fosters
corruption.
1.3.3 Impact of Stability
While solving for the optimal rst period behavior of "bad" incumbents, we come
to the main topic of the Chapter, the question of whether the stability of an economy
will have any impact on the degree of corruption within this country. To answer this
question we set up a lemma and several additional propositions.
Lemma 1.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with monotonic beliefs as dened
above, an incumbent I with θ(I) = b chooses l1 = l ⇔ δ(u0ab + l) > ẽ.
Proof
The incumbent maximizes her expected payo as follows:
l(θ(I)) = argmaxlEUP (θ(I), l)
Thus, an incumbent with θ(I) = g chooses l1 = l. An incumbent with θ(I) = b
chooses l1 such that
l1 = argmaxl1E(u0 + abl1 + p(v = I)δ(u0 + abl)) (1.7)
= argmaxl1E(u0 + abl1 + F (β(e))δ(u0 + abl))
= argmaxl1E(abl1 +
∫ ẽ
−ẽ−l
β(e) de δ(u0 + abl))
(1.8)
So, l1 = l if and only if
EUP (l1 = l) > EUP (l1 = l) ⇔ (1.9)
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∫ ẽ
−ẽ−l
(
p(e|l1 = l)β(e|l1 = l)− p(e|l1 = l)β(e|l1 = l)
)
de >
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
Equation 1.9 states the general condition for a low corruption choice for an arbi-
trary density function h(·) of shocks s. For the case of uniformly distributed prior
beliefs α and uniformly distributed shocks s this yields:
l1 = l ⇔ 1
2ẽ
(
π(2ẽ− l) + l − π(2ẽ− l)
)
>
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
⇔ 1
2ẽ
>
ab
δ(u0 + abl)
⇔ δ
2
(
u0
ab
+ l) > ẽ (1.10)
2
Lemma 1.1 states the condition for a "bad" incumbent to behave properly in the
rst period. The probability to do so increases in δ as this leads to a higher valuation of
second period payos and thus gives an incentive to stay in oce, and the probability
to get reelected can be maximized by abstain from corruption. Clearly, increasing
u0 also has a positive impact on behaving properly in the rst period, as it rises
the payo in the second period and thus the incentive to get reelected. Interestingly,
rising the volume of corruption, namely l, has the same eect of lowering the incentive
of rst period corruption, though it aects both periods. Obviously, the disadvantage
from the diminished reelection probability overweighs the advantage of higher rst
period gains. This issue will be discussed below Corollary 1.1. Increasing ab rises
the willingness to engage in rst period corruption, as it increases immediate gains
from corruption more than future gains, which has to be discounted by δ and the
probability of getting reelected. The probability of rst period corruption is also
increasing in ẽ, as it rises the right hand side of (1.10).
Proposition 1.3 For xed l, ab and δ, there exists a u0 s.t. u0 > u0 ⇒ l1 = 0 for all
θ in equilibrium, and u0 = ab(2ẽδ − l).
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Proof
Rewriting (1.10) leads to
u0 > ab(
2ẽ
δ
− l)
thus
u0 = ab(
2ẽ
δ
− l). (1.11)
Therefore and because l1 = 0 for θ(I) = g, l1 = 0 for sure if and only if u0 > u0,
other things held constant.
2
Proposition 1.3 is a second result of the model and basically states that the amount
of rst period corruption is decreasing in the benets or "wages" of being in of-
ce. This argument that ocers are less in need for income from non-legal activities
when they are suciently payed is often found in the ocials and politicians salary
discussion. u0 is the higher the more impatient politicians are, because then they
increasingly prefer immediate gains from corruption to future gains from salary.
If we think of non-linear per period utility functions of politicians, the salary
needs to be the lower, the higher the concavity of the utility function is, because
politicians then might want to smoothen their income over periods and therefore
more likely abstain from corruption in period 1. Note that this eect is aected by
saving possibilities. If politicians are able to transfer wealth to the 2nd period, the
critical salary rises because the dependency on constant income is falling. This plays
an important role when thinking about non-democratic countries. The politician
gets additional disciplined by the threat of revolution if this threat includes a risk of
losing some saved money (because it is xed in assets, land, and so on, which can be
expropriated in case of a revolution). Hence the lower a politician's possibilities to
save money in a secure way, the less he will risk to induce a rebellion by behaving
too corrupt.
Corollary 1.1 For xed ab and δ, the critical "wage" u0 decreases in the size of l.
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Proof
trivial.
2
The statement of Corollary 1.1 appears rather counterintuitive at a rst glance.
Analogous to the phenomenon discussed in Lemma 1.1, it makes the assertion that,
other things held constant, the critical salary to prevent the politician from getting
into corruption decreases when the volume of potential corruptive activities increases.
This is because an increase of volume of corruption leads both to a higher risk of get-
ting identied as being the corrupt type and losing second period gains, and to a
higher volume of second period benets, making it more desirable to win elections in
period 1. Therefore if the volume of corruption rises, the incumbent has increasing
motivation to behave properly in period 1 to preserve his chances to get reelected and
to extract the increasing second period benets when corruption is riskless. However
this only holds true if the politician has to decide between l and l in a discrete manner
as in our model.
An even more interesting fact is that equation 1.11 contains the variance of eco-
nomic output, which brings us to our main proposition, stating the negative corre-
lation between output stability and the expected level of corruption within an econ-
omy. For this, we consider a world where the gains for "bad" politicians, ab, potential
corruption volume l and base utility u0 are dierent for dierent economies. More
precisely we assume, that the u0 for each country is drawn out of a distribution that
assigns a positive probability mass to the range [ab(2eδ − l); ab(2eδ − l)].7 Now we can
state
Proposition 1.4 Expected total corruption is monotonically decreasing in output sta-
bility.
7This means there are cases where a given u0 would suce to deter politicians from corruption
in a stable economy (ẽ = e), but not in an unstable one (ẽ = e).
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Proof
Because "good" politicians always choose l1 = l2 = l and "bad" ones always l2 = l,
we can focus on the rst period decisions of incumbents with θ(I) = b and compare
them for low and high variance of e:
Clearly, u0(e) > u0(e) for e > e, thus there exists a range [u0(e); u0(e)] with
|[u0(e); u0(e)]| > 0, s.t. for u0 ∈ [u0(e); u0(e)] the "bad" politician chooses l1 = 0
if ẽ = e and l1 = l if ẽ = e.
As we assumed a positive probability for u0 ∈ [u0(e); u0(e)], the probability that
u0 < u0 (i.e. high rst-period corruption) is lower for the more stable economy.
Second-period corruption stays unaected, hence expected overall corruption de-
creases monotonically in output stability. 8
Stated dierently, with randomly chosen variables, equation 1.10 is more likely to
be satised if ẽ = e than if ẽ = e.
2
Proposition 1.4 states our main thesis, i.e. high variance amplies corruption and
thus the channel between economic stability and corruption does not only work from
corruption to stability but also from stability to corruption. The intuition for this is
that it is easier for politicians to hide their dubious aairs away in the rather uncertain
environment of an unstable economy than in the more deterministic case of a stable
economy.
For a cross country comparison as presented in chapter 2, this means that the
parameter space that leads to high corruption is larger for countries with low economic
stability. Thus if one assumes that parameters are dierent between countries (e.g. u0
or l diers from country to country), one should expect a negative correlation between
output stability and corruption when observing a larger number of countries.
8if we would allow for a choice of l1 out of a continuous set, a bad incumbent would always choose
his optimal level of corruption and the proposition would strengthen to strict monotonicity.
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1.4 Conclusion
In our model we have shown that the possibility for extended corrupt activities
of politicians should be higher in countries with an unstable economic output and
that remuneration, risk-aversion and the level of control exercised by the voters play
important roles in determining the incentives to engage in corruption. Therefore we
should on average expect a higher level of corruption in countries with a high variance
in economic output.
An interesting addition to the theoretical model would be the endogenization of
economic growth by explicitly modeling the interaction between the level of corrup-
tion and the amount of investments in a economy as it is highlighted for example
by Alesina and Perotti (1996). On the one hand this could provide insight in the
triangle relationship between corruption, growth and stability and deliver additional
arguments for the question of causality that we will face in Chapter 2. On the other
hand this would require additional assumptions on the mechanics of the model econ-
omy and it is not clear if the clear cut results of our model would change for the
better in the end.
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A Cross-Country Study on Economic
Stability and Corruption
In this chapter we want to focus on a task many scientists working in economic
theory put little weight on, namely the empirical checking of our model against reality.
This step is not as trivial and natural as most outsiders might expect. After all
it includes the risk of reality disagreeing with our model predictions. This would
somewhat deplete the persuasiveness of the model in the best case and make it ab-
solutely untrustworthy in the worst case. Nevertheless we are convinced that - if
possible - empirical verication of results from theoretical models is necessary before
making a precise advice or stating well-dened declarations. Without a proper test-
ing a theoretical model remains no more than a theory among a large set of possible
theories.
Therefore we added this cross-country study to our model from Chapter 1, being
aware that our abilities in empirical economics are limited compared to a scientist
doing only empirical work. We will stick to basic tools from panel data analysis and
of course we do not want to prove that variance of economic output is the only source
of corruption. The main goal is to nd empirical evidence conrming our view that
it is plausible to think about instability as one reason for amplifying corruption.
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2.1 Data
One of the problems when running a cross country regression concerning cor-
ruption is the measurability of corruption. Due to the partly subjective and secret
character of corruption there is hardly any exact measure of it for any given country.
Until the mid-1990s most empirical ndings concerning corruption were of a mere
anecdotal nature and cross-country comparisons were speculative and theoretical.
Corruption was even cited as a classic example of a phenomenon that was observable
but not quantiable. Later on, the empirical research on corruption grew signi-
cantly because of increasing international public and private interest in determining
and curbing it. Today, most major surveys use polls to obtain their data. This means
that some personal perception is retained in the data. But for large numbers of ob-
servations the broad picture should at least give a somewhat realistic impression of
the actual level of corruption in a country.
There is a number of dierent country risk surveys including ratings of corruption
in there analysis. One is the Index of Business International (BI), a private rm now
integrated in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). It ranked countries on a range
from 1 to 10 in the years 1980-1983 and is used for example by Mauro (1995). Another
index using a notion of corruption is the "Civil Rights Index" of Freedom House.
It uses a criterium called "Free of Corruption" and provides data for 192 countries,
nevertheless it is problematic to isolate the actual inuence of the corruption criterium
on this index value.
Probably the most famous source which tries to rank countries according to their
level of corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency In-
ternational, which is published yearly in a global corruption report (Transparency
International 2003). Basically it is a survey that subsumes a larger number of cross
country polls, most of which reect the opinion of people working for multinational
rms and institutions. The original polls are carried out by NGOs as well as by pri-
vate institutions.1 Thus, they capture the degree of corruption from a mostly western
1For a comprehensive list of the composition of the CPI see (Transparency International 2003).
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(but also pretty homogeneous) point of view. The CPI assigns a score between 0
(severe corruption) and 10 (no corruption) to to each country. In our research we use
the CPI of 2003 because it seems to provide the most independent and unbiased mea-
sure of corruption and is freely available to the public. Also it includes many other
corruption indices in its composition and benets from high correlation to those not
included.2
In order to check for the results of our model we ran some regression models to
match the variance of a countries GDP per capita growth with its CPI value. The
variance in GDP per capita growth is calculated from the cross-country GDP values
from the Penn World Table (2001) for the time horizon of 20 years (1981-2000).3
2.2 Regressions on Whole Data Set
To illustrate the correlation between GDP growth variance and the CPI without
regard of the underlying causality, we rst ran a simple OLS regression (model (1))
with the CPI as the dependent variable and only the standard deviation of growth
on the explaining side:
CPI = α1 + α2σ (2.1)
where σ denotes the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth over the given
time horizon. Graphically the correlation is depicted in Figure 2.1, with the bold
line being the linear trend line of the correlation. Its slope is the highly signicant
coecient from Table 2.2 and suggests a negative correlation between CPI and σ as
a stylized fact.4
2A table of correlation coecients between the CPI and other corruption indices is given in
(Transparency International 2003).
3Stability seems to be a somewhat persistent phenomenon as calculations with other time horizons
(10, 30 years) led to similar results.
4Remember that high CPI-values indicate low corruption.
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Figure 2.1: Negative correlation between standard deviation of economic
output and CPI in a simple regression
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To get a better understanding of the causality and the impact of σ on CPI, we
set up some more complex models. First we specify model (2), which includes some
common explanatory variables on corruption additional to σ (The papers using them
are cited later on). Therefore we include the drift d of the GDP growth rate, the
democracy level of 1995 dem95, the investment level inv as a percentage of GDP,
the variable school as the percentage of age 15+ population in secondary school and
the variable ethno that describes the ethnolinguistic fractionalization of a country.
d is the average growth rate in percent per year derived from the GDP data of
1981-2000, dem95 takes values from 0 to 1 (1 being very democratic) and is taken
from (Barro 1999) to control for democratization of the countries. inv is from the
Penn World Table and school is computed from the updated (Barro and Lee 2000)
dataset on education, both averages from 1980-2000. ethno is the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization index calculated by Taylor and Hudson (1972). It measures the
probability that two randomly chosen persons of a given country will not belong to
the same ethnolinguistic group. Its value ranges from 100 (very high fractionalization)
to 0 (total ethnolinguistic homogeneity).
Additionally we include the variable protestant as the percentage of protestants
in a society, the variable import denoting the openness to trade (i.e. the goods
and services imported as a percentage of GDP), the dummy variables formerUK
(former British colony or UK) and federal (federal constitution). Finally we include
the variable absgovwage as the absolute wage of central government members in
thousands of 1990 US-Dollars.5 protestant, import, formerUK and federal are
found to explain a large amount of corruption in the models of Treisman (2000).
absgovwage is included because of its relation to our theory and is derived from
Treisman's data on relative income of central government members to GDP per capita
which in turn is taken from (Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee 1997).
Another variable closely related to the level of corruption in a country is the level
of GDP per capita. However, GDP per capita is very strongly correlated to the other
explaining variables in the model (it can be explained with an R2 = 0.81) and thus is
5All data can be found in the appendix.
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not entered explicitly to avoid multicolinearity. It is an interesting question which way
the causality between GPD per capita and the other explaining variables in model
(2) works but here we decided to focus on the other variables. To be on the safe side
we also did models that included GDP per capita explicitly using robust estimation
techniques to correct for collinearity and σ still stays signicant at the 5%-level. The
same holds true for all following regression models.
The coecients of model (2) can be found in Table 2.2.
The CPI of 2003 is explained very well in the model, with an adjusted R2 = 0.8071.6
Note that we use percentage changes in GDP per capita to calculate the variance and
therefore the standard deviation σ =
√
var(∆GDP/capita) is normalized. For low
σ, the economy evolved in a relatively "stable" way over the last 20 years, whereas
high values of σ indicate an economy with large short term deviations from the long
term drift in economic output growth, hence an "unstable" economy in our denition.
The correlation between CPI and σ is negative as anticipated by Proposition
1.4 and the t-value indicates a result signicant at the 5% level. In model (2) even
under consideration of the many other explanatory variables, σ still has a considerable
impact on CPI. Take for example Cameroon, Uganda and Angola, which can be found
on places 73, 72 and 67 out of 75 regarding the level of corruption and on places 72,
73 and 75 regarding stability. According to model (2) a reduction of their σ to lets say
the level of Thailand would increase their CPI level by 1.39, 1.73 and 1.96 respectively
corresponding to positions 49, 37 and 40 among the countries under consideration.
Interesting is the fact that the drift d in growth rates does not have any signicant
impact on corruption in model (2), whereas often it is suggested in the literature that
high growth would decrease corruption. Also, including the absolute volume of GDP
per capita does not display a signicant coecient thus the richness of a countries
inhabitants does only play a minor role in explaining corruption in this model.
Also, absgovwage is signicant at the 5%-level and displays the positive correla-
6We are aware of the boundedness of our dependent variable, however, as the range is from 1-10,
we still use an OLS model.
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Table 2.1: Results of OLS regressions
dependent variable: CPI
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of obs. 75 50 62 51 49
σ -0.5674***
(0.1069)
-0.2614**
(0.1142)
-0.2200***
(0.0801)
-0.1946**
(0.0805)
-0.4647***
(0.1526)
d 0.1261
(0.0896)
dem95 1.7283**
(0.6906)
2.0167***
(0.6136)
1.6983**
(0.6784)
1.5532***
(0.7686)
inv 0.0222
(0.0349)
school 0.0171
(0.0213)
0.0649***
(0.0133)
0.0410**
(0.0169)
0.0340*
(0.0178)
ethno -0.0124
(0.0081)
protestant 0.0364***
(0.0085)
0.0306***
(0.0069)
0.0311***
(0.0078)
0.0287***
(0.0079)
formerUK 0.7193*
(0.4230)
import 0.0223**
(0.0091)
0.0342***
(0.0071)
0.0290***
(0.0076)
0.0280***
(0.0075)
federal 0.2433
(0.4779)
absgovwage 0.0436**
(0.0166)
0.0486***
(0.0155)
0.0355**
(0.0168)
constant 1.3895
(0.9369)
0.6414
(0.7143)
0.6248
(0.7007)
2.4281
R2 0.2784 0.8472 0.7878 0.8279 0.8418
adj. R2 0.2685 0.8030 0.7688 0.8045 0.8192
Model (5) uses predictions σ̂ from the instrumental regression instead of actual σ-values.
*** denotes signicance at the 1%-level, ** denotes signicance at the 5%-level, * denotes signicance
at the 10%-level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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tion to the CPI that we predicted in Proposition 1.3. High wages thus reduce the
level of corruption in our sample of countries. The eect is strong if you note that
the range of absgovwage is from 0 to 50, compared to 0-10 for the CPI. In fact the
beta-value, i.e. the standardized regression coecient, is -0.2367 for cpi03 and 0.2399
for absgovwage, thus both eects are roughly of the same magnitude.
Next we reduce model (2) to all signicant variables to check whether the impact of
σ stays unchanged. We set up two new models (3) and (4), both containing σ, dem95,
school, protestant, and import as explaining variables and model (4) additionally
containing absgovwage. School is included as it turns out to be the only variable
which is highly correlated with absgovwage and which changes its t-value drastically
if absgovwage is excluded from model (2).7
The reduced models show that the coecients of σ stay pretty much unchanged
whereas its signicance is even rising close to the 1%-level, indicating that the un-
derlying relationship is not negligible. absgovwage became signicant at the 1%-level
in model (4). The impact of all predictors in model (4) has about the same magni-
tude, as can be seen in Table 2.2, where beta-coecients of the regression are shown.
Note that for model (4) it was even possible to increase the adjusted R2 to 0.8045.
Controlling models (2), (3) and (4) for heteroscedasticity by deriving robust standard
errors using a White correction does not change the signicance levels of any of the
explaining variables.
This results are encouraging, still it is not easy to show the direction of the causal-
ity between σ and CPI. To test for that, one would need appropriate instruments for
σ. We tried to explain σ by the investment level inv and dummies for intermediate
and OECD countries, inter and OECD. These three can explain σ with an adjusted
R2 of 0.4153.8
7In fact, school gets signicant at the 5%-level if absgovwage is excluded from model (2).
8We also tried to use normalized terms of trade variance as taken from the World Development
Indicators (2002) as an instrument for σ, but it turns out that - with a ρ = 0.07 - this variable is
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Table 2.2: Beta-coecients of model (4)
Variable beta-coe. Variable beta-coe.
σ -0.1725 protestant 0.2967
dem95 0.2050 import 0.2536
school 0.2346 absgovwage 0.2653
Using predictions of σ̂ in model (4) leads to model (5) where the coecient of
σ̂ changes considerably compared to the use of non-instrumented values of σ but at
least it stays signicant at the 1%-level. As in any empirical research on corruption
with its many interacting factors it is still not easy to entirely reject the hypotheses
that CPI aects σ and not the other way round. Nevertheless we argue that a high
level of corruption might well have a negative impact on the volume of growth in
GDP but we do not see many reasons why it should increase the variance of growth
in GDP, especially as it turns out that corruption levels do not change quickly over
time for the most countries. Additional support for this point of view comes from
Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993). They show in their paper that
much variation in growth rates is due to random shocks and not connected to coun-
try characteristics. Their empirical results are supported by the nding that country
characteristics (and also corruption levels) are strongly autocorrelated and very per-
sistent whereas growth rates are not. Therefore it seems much more plausible that σ
is the independent variable and not CPI and we stick to our theory that the causality
of the signicant relation between CPI and σ works from σ to CPI and not the other
way round.
Another way to check for causality would be the analysis of global recessions or
phases of high worldwide growth variance and their impact on corruption. Higher
overall variance in growth should lead to higher mean levels of corruption according
not suciently correlated to σ.
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to our theory. Unfortunately time series for corruption data are hardly available,
partly because the quantication of corruption is a relatively new concept, and partly
because the methods of compiling the indices are changing over time.9 Also, dierent
measures of corruption can not be compared, because of the blurry nature of corrup-
tion denitions. Thus we had to abandon the idea of doing an additional time series
analysis with respect to global recessions.
2.3 Regressions Dierentiating by Level of Democ-
ratization
As said above, we expect our model to work best for democratic societies where
the people has the best means to punish politicians for opportunistic behavior. There-
fore we ran two additional regressions based on model (4). Model (6) is similar to
model (4) but uses only "democratic" countries, model (7) uses only "non-democratic"
countries. Again, it is not too easy to nd a reliable variable for the level of democ-
ratization of a country, as many countries call themselves democratic or even run
elections, that are denitely non-democratic from an objective point of view. For our
study we follow Barro (1999) and refer to the indicator of political rights compiled by
Gastil (1991) and followers. Originally, Gastil classied each country from 1 (highest
level of political rights) to 7 (lowest level). We use the transformed data of Barro10,
where 1 denotes the highest level of political rights, and 0 the lowest. Countries with
a democracy index higher than 0.8 in 1995 (45 out of 75 observations) are classied
as democratic, others as non-democratic. The results (along with the repeated re-
sults of model (4)) are shown in Table 2.3.11 The σ-coecient is only signicant for
democratic countries and plays a minor role for non-democratic countries, conrming
our theory. In contrast, school, import and absgovwage are only signicant for non
9Transparency International for example explicitly warns not to use its CPI reports as time series
as the survey method and the sample changed many times.
10Which we already included in model (2).
11Robust errors are used to control for heteroscedasticity.
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Figure 2.2: Negative correlation between standard deviation of economic
output and CPI, dierentiated for democratic (dcpi03) and
non-democratic (ndcpi03) countries
democratic countries, indicating that these variables play a minor role for the accrue-
ment of corruption in democratic countries. 12
To give a graphical representation, we ran two simple regressions as in model (1),
for democratic and non-democratic countries respectively. Results (denoted by (8)
for democratic and (9) for non-democratic) are shown in Table 2.3. In the simple
regression, the σ-coecient is, as expected, only signicant for democratic countries.
For them this simple model yields an R2 of 0.4143. For non-democratic countries,
the σ-coecient is insignicant and the R2 is pretty close to zero. In Figure 2.2, the
CPI of both democratic and non-democratic countries is plotted against σ additional
12We included dem95 in this regression to maintain comparability to model (4). It has a very
high coecient in model (6), but note that its range is only from 0.8-1 in the group of democratic
countries. This relativizes its impact and makes it equal in magnitude to its impact in model (4).
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Table 2.3: Results of OLS regressions, dierentiating between
democratic and non-democratic countries
dependent variable: CPI
Variable (4) (6) (7) (8) (9)
# of obs. 51 31 20 45 30
σ -0.1946**
(0.0805)
-0.2678***
(0.0722)
-0.0311
(0.0491)
-0.6672***
(0.1209)
-0.1474
(0.1494)
d
dem95 1.6983**
(0.6784)
9.7613*
(5.1402)
0.2614
(0.7303)
inv
school 0.0410**
(0.0169)
0.0285
(0.0232)
0.0427**
(0.0152)
ethno
protestant 0.0311***
(0.0078)
0.0270***
(0.0078)
-0.0095
(0.0192)
formerUK
import 0.0290***
(0.0076)
0.0200
(0.0138)
0.0303***
(0.0080)
federal
absgovwage 0.0486***
(0.0155)
0.0367
(0.0254)
0.0509**
(0.0234)
constant 0.6248
(0.7007)
-5.5768
(4.6524)
0.5810
(0.5847)
8.3772***
(0.5473)
4.0267***
(0.7814)
R2 0.8279 0.7656 0.8830 0.4143 0.0336
adj. R2 0.8045 0.4007 -0.0010
*** denotes signicance at the 1%-level, ** denotes signicance at the 5%-level, * denotes signicance
at the 10%-level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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to the linear trend line of each group.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we tested the results of the theoretical model of Chapter 1 in a
cross-country study to conrm our predictions with the help of real world observa-
tions.
The data in the cross-country study conrms the main nding of Chapter 1 well, as
standard deviation of per capita GDP growth displays a signicant and non-negligible
coecient in all relevant regression models. Also, our second proposition, the negative
correlation of politicians remunerations and the level of corruption, is conrmed by
the data.
Summarizing, the tting of the theoretical predictions in Chapter 1 and the em-
pirical results in Chapter 2 seems to be good. Of course there could be other possible
explanations for these results. An alternative explanation would be that in unstable
economies politicians are more afraid of future stability and development because of
a higher risk of institutional crisis in this case, therefore discounting the future with
a lower δ, which in turn would lead to a more myopic behavior of "bad" politicians
in the rst period of being in oce and hence to a higher degree of corruption. At
least, this interpretation would be consistent with the theoretical model as can be
seen from equation 1.9.
A further extension of the theoretical model as discussed in the Conclusion of
Chapter 1 might help to rule out dierent possible explanations. On the other hand
already the presented theoretical model and the additional empirical ndings can
hopefully give an interesting impulse for thinking not only about corruption aecting
the path of economic output but also to take into account the characteristics of
economic output paths as one additional source of corruption itself.
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Learning in Financial Markets: A
Model of Asset Pricing with
Heterogeneous Agents
In this chapter, we want to explore another notion of learning, which has hardly
been explored in economic theory so far, namely learning in a sense of changing infor-
mation processing strategies. We try to depart as little as possible from classical model
building blocks but introduce heterogeneity in the quality of agents belief formation
to explain frequently observed phenomena on nancial markets. Besides providing
alternative explanations for these phenomena, the model has a methodological mo-
tivation and wants to show that approaches from behavioral learning economics can
well be used to deliver some microfoundation for classical economic problems within
a highly formalized framework.
3.1 Introduction
Empirical research in recent years showed that asset prices often exhibit charac-
teristic behavior that cannot satisfactory be explained by classical approaches like the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharp (1964) and Lintner (1965). Among the
most frequent results obtained by econometric research are phenomena like short term
39
Chapter 3
momentum in asset prices and long-run fundamental reversion. Also, excess volatil-
ity that persists after the arrival of shocks is frequently observed. Other ndings are
over- and underpricing when new information is arriving at the market.1
One approach to cope with the observed puzzles is to introduce psychological ev-
idence into economic modeling, e.g. by dropping the assumption of perfectly rational
behavior. Psychological research supports this approach as it shows that human be-
ings do not seem to be able to estimate and calculate all possible uncertainties at
once and without time delay. Instead they tend to trade-o reasoning-time against
optimality and often use heuristics to come to quicker and mostly sucient deci-
sions. Using heuristics means that a decision maker tries to roughly categorize a
given problem, to split it in sub-problems and to reduce it to previously solved tasks.
Thus humans often try to save on calculation eort by refereing to their experience or
to former solutions they gured out when they rst encountered a somehow similar
task.
When applying this theory on nancial markets, it is obvious that gaining expe-
rience in trading should increase the quality of a subject's decision as it can draw on
an increasing base of reference cases and it should have adjusted his decision making
process as a reaction to former feedbacks. Consequently the returns of a trader should
partly depend on her experience and her life-cycle returns should exhibit certain pat-
terns dependent on the combination of market condition and individual experience.
It is important to highlight the dierence of learning in the sense described above
to learning as it mostly is understood in classical economic modeling. There, learning
mostly deals with the acquisition of new information and not with the improvement
of one's capability of correct information processing respectively of one's progress of
correct decision making. To make this point clear, let us state the issue in terms of
a "reaction function" y = f(x), where x is the information available to the subject,
y is her response, and f is the decision process. Classical theory assumes that f is a
"rational process", i.e. the y is the best possible response given x. Learning would
only take place via x, hence by acquisition of new information, whereas f would not
1See Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998), Rouwenhorst (1999).
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change. In contrast, we argue that learning takes place both on x and on f , such that
the reaction y improves both because the set of available information grows and the
quality of the decision process f increases over time.
In the model at hand we follow the goal to set up a unied behavioral model
for nancial markets that incorporates this idea of learning and that explains all the
named phenomena in asset pricing. Thus, the motivation for this work is twofold:
First, we have an explanatory goal as to explain the phenomena of underpricing,
overpricing, excess volatility, life cycle trading returns and the behavior of stock prices
after shocks to fundamental values.
Second, we have a methodological intention as we want to introduce a new aspect
to economic modeling by considering the improvement in personal decision strategies
over time in an economic model. To the best of our knowledge this aspect has not
been raised before and we think that exploring it could help to understand some
puzzling patterns in observed human behavior. In particular we will try to shed light
on how these heterogeneous and improving heuristics might inuence the development
of supply and demand and hence prices in an asset market.
More specically, and in contrast to former models, our model features agents
which are heterogeneous not with respect to the information they have available, but
also to their belief formation heuristics. That means that young and inexperienced
agents will process the available information in another (and less ecient) way, than
experienced traders. Based on the same information set the former will come to an
inferior decision that the latter.
This is modeled by equipping all agents with two kinds of information: First a
noisy "fundamental" signal reecting possible shocks to the fundamental value of an
risky asset, and second an observation of past price moves or "momentum".2 Depend-
2There is a lot of evidence that there is in fact momentum trading in asset markets. Kahneman,
Slovic and Tversky (1982) widely discuss this issue, and Grin and Tversky (1992) formed the
notion of conservatism, e.g. the inertia of belief on the arrival of new information. De Bondt (1993)
provides empirical research based on 38,000 forecasts of stock prices and exchange rates and comes
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ing on their age3, agents either put high weight on their momentum observation or
on the signal observation when forming their nal belief about the expected payo of
the asset. As agents get older their experience and thus their "degree of rationality"
increases.
The interplay of the dierent belief formation strategies and the resulting dier-
ences in demand lead to interesting dynamics in the pricing of the risky asset and can
explain the formation of pricing bubbles and the presence of excess volatility.
We show that instantly after the arrival of a (positive) shock to fundamentals
there will be underpricing in our model as suggested by the empirical evidence. This
is due to the fact that inexperienced market participants underestimate the relevance
of the fundamental signal and do not adjust their demand suciently. In the next
period, as additional to the new fundamental situation momentum is observed, there
will be overpricing. In a positive feedback manner, overpricing will persist for some
time until short selling by the experienced (rational) traders prevails and the bubble
is bursting. Now, a downward cascade will take place as negative momentum is
increasing. Eventually the mispricing cycle will fade out and the price will converge
against the fair price.
During the mispricing period, inexperienced traders on average will lose money,
as they misjudge the true value of the asset by incorporating their momentum obser-
vation in their decision. On the other hand, experienced traders are able to realize
excess returns in expectations, as they can prot from the wrong positions of inex-
perienced traders. As every trader belongs to each group once in his lifetime, it is
to the conclusion that "non-experts" expect the continuation of past "trends" in prices, whereas
"experts" do not behave in such a way. Another strong indicator for real world momentum-like
trade is the existence of the large industry of technical analysis one can observe at the nancial
markets and which tries to forecast future price paths by past observation. Clearly there must be
some demand for this services to keep that industry alive. See also Frankel and Froot (1990) for
empirical evidence on the existence of so-called "chartists".
3Age is the time agents are active in the market and thus is set equivalent to experience in that
market.
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not clear whether the losses in the rst phase or the additional gains in later periods
prevail. We show that the timing of market entrance is crucial for overall lifetime
performance. When agents enter in times with high mispricing they are unlikely to
recover from their rst periods losses later in their life. In contrast, if they enter
in calm times and are able to collect experience without losing to much, their later
periods excess returns are likely to overcompensate for early losses.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
After some thoughts on the methodological classication of our model, a survey of
related literature follows in this section. In Section 2 we introduce our theoretical
model and state propositions for the basic setting. In Section 3 we present some results
of numerical simulations, e.g. price paths and life-cycle performance of traders. In
Chapter 4 we extend our model to the dynamic case. There we also present an outlook
and an agenda for an possible empirical conrmation of our theoretical results.
3.1.1 Methodological Considerations
We think that our approach might be helpful to better understand the formation of
trading strategies and its impact on asset market prices. Nevertheless we know that it
is always risky to deviate from classical theory as one quickly enters a somewhat dusty
area of scientic uncertainty. However, we are convinced that anyway it is necessary to
explore that region in the hope of nding some new and possibly useful supplementary
insights within. In any case, the departure from widely accepted assumptions should
only be done with extreme care and only if no other way seems to be passable. Hong
and Stein (Hong and Stein, 1999, p.2144) set up a list of "requirements" to justify
theories departuring from full rationality and unlimited computational capacity of
investors:
"(1) [they have to...] rest on assumptions about investor behavior that are
either a priori plausible or consistent with casual observation; (2) explain
the existing evidence in a parsimonious and unied way; and (3) make a
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number of further predictions that can be subject to 'out-of sample' testing
and that are ultimately validated."
We try to stick to this criteria and to classical modeling tools where ever possi-
ble. However there are of course dierent opinions about behavioral approaches. One
somewhat harsh critique of behavioral methods in economic theory can by found in
Rubinstein (2000). The cited paper surely hits some critical points. We nevertheless
think that behavioral approaches will probably not be the magic bullet for all un-
solved questions, but are worth to be as seriously considered as any classical attempt
for the sake of more realistic economic models.
3.1.2 Learning and Decision Making
In this Chapter we focus on a maturing process of improving decision making over
time, thus unexperienced traders use a suboptimal heuristic for their decisions and
improve it over time until they nally reach perfectly optimal behavior. To represent
suboptimal decision making, our model takes a behavioral approach, and we are con-
vinced that this point of view will allow for explanations of puzzles that cannot be
solved by pure standard theory in a satisfactory way.
In the behavioral literature there are a couple of approaches to explain decision
making that seem to be suboptimal from a classical point of view. Psychological
research and experiments support most of these approaches in some way and it is not
entirely clear until now which approach suites best for which problem set or whether
a unifying theory could be formulated to incorporate all directions of this research
area.
One approach is to alter the shape of utility functions to incorporate psychological
or behavioral ndings in the process of decision making:
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced their "prospect theory", an
alternative form of utility function including the psychological fact that people seem
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to be "loss averse". The resulting function is not dierentiable but has a kink at a
certain reference point, making the subject excessively risk averse around this point.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) oered an related explanation of the equity premium puz-
zle rst stated by Mehra and Prescott (1985). They showed that by frequent portfolio
evaluations the eect of the kink accumulates and makes an equity premium necessary
to compensate for psychological costs due to the high risk aversion around the refer-
ence point. Another approach is the hyperbolic discounting applied by Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992), where preferences are inconsistent over time and actual decisions
will be revised in the future. Work in that direction can also be found in Benabou and
Tirole (2002) or in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose
a utility function with an additional fairness term such that subjects bias their choice
in a direction where payo dierences compared to a reference group are smaller. In
Gebhardt (2001) a model is set up that allows diverging price paths in asset pricing
by using Fehr-Schmidt preferences for investors.
Other approaches preserve the classical utility function but claim that systematic
"errors" are made during the decision process. One approach of that kind is the
mental accounting literature, e.g. Barberis and Huang (2001). Here it is argued that
the same loss or gain can be valued dierently depending on its framing. Another
theory explains suboptimal behavior by investors overcondence in private informa-
tion. This idea was raised by Barber and Odean (2000) and then used for example
in a model by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) to explain over- and
underpricing.
As a further example for systematic errors in a nancial context, momentum
trading is often cited. Momentum traders expect price changes to be positively auto-
correlated and thus buy when prices are rising. Of course in the long run this does
not make much sense but actually there are empirical hints that returns are indeed
short-run positively auto-correlated (see Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1990). To-
gether with overcondence (in identifying the right moment to leave the trend) it
therefore seems imaginable that some traders might follow this strategy. A model
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where momentum traders are used along with "news watcher" is set up by Hong and
Stein (Hong and Stein, 1999). In their model, momentum traders are justied by
the assumption that news spread slowly in the market and thus positive returns are
possible by doing momentum trading. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) conrm this as-
sumption by carrying out an empirical test to show that gradual information ow in
markets exist. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) as well as Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakon-
ishok (1996) propose some momentum strategies in their papers. Further discussion
of this issue can also be found in Hong and Stein (1999).
In our model traders use a simple momentum strategy when rst entering the mar-
ket and then improve their strategy towards an "optimal" rational decision process
over time. When classifying it, our model combines two features: Features of models
with two types of traders as the Hong and Stein (1999) model mentioned above or the
model by Grinblatt and Han (2002) where a group of "rational" traders and a group
with "disposition aected" traders interact. And features of models where investors
change their view of the world over time as there is for example Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998), where representative investors consider the world switching be-
tween two "regimes", a mean reverting and a trend one following a Markov process.
Also, Hong and Stein (2003) set up another model where investors switch between
two forecasting models both of which use only a part of the available information.
Investors change the model in use only if it did a particularly poor job in forecasting.
Note that none of the cited models exhibit monotonic increase of the quality of
agents decision making processes. Rather agents either stay in their group and stick
to a certain type of decision making strategy, or they can switch to and fro between
the dierent modes arbitrarily often without continuity, as in Hong and Stein (2003).
While this might well t to map certain aspects of human decision making it is not
what we would call leaning, as we think learning always leads from a suboptimal
behavior to a more optimal one in a predominantly monotonic way.
This is the crucial new aspect in our model. There are heterogeneous groups of
traders and they incrementally ameliorate their decision making strategies over time
when getting experienced. A trader starts with a weak decision making strategy and
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ends with a strong one, i.e. a perfectly rational one, such that each trader belongs to
each group once in his lifetime.
The improvement of decision strategies is only dependent of time, i.e. it is not
triggered by observations or outside processes but purely by collecting experience
in signal processing and it is incremental in a sense that it improves from a pretty
suboptimal momentum strategy to a fully rational fundamental signal observation
strategy. Our motivation thereby is to fetch a gradual improvement of investors
behavior with respect to optimality.
3.2 The Model
To capture the ideas developed above we set up an overlapping generations model
with discrete time steps where agents improve the quality of their decisions over time.
Each period traders get signals from the fundamental process and they can observe
past price changes. When rst entering the market they are not experienced and
behave in a suboptimal way by forming their beliefs on the basis of a momentum
strategy. In addition to possible rationalizations of momentum trading indicated in
Section 3.1.2, the motivation behind this is that beginners are particularly susceptible
to momentum behavior as they tend to follow the advise and the behavior of others
since feeling unsure about their own judgement abilities.
When getting older and collecting experience, the traders learn to draw their
own conclusions from the observed fundamental signal and older generations form
beliefs more and more on the basis of signal observation. Thus belief formation is
heterogeneous across generations.
The nal belief bit of generation i is therefore composed out of two "intermediate"
beliefs bsit (signal component) and bmit (momentum component). The exact mechanism
is described below in Section 3.2.5.
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3.2.1 Assets
There is a risky asset A which can be bought and sold by the agents once per
period. More precisely A represents a sequence of short time assets. It is liquidated
at the end of each period and is issued again at the beginning of the next period. The
price is formed by the market clearing condition and the asset is in zero net supply,
thus each unit purchased by an agent has to be sold short by someone else. The asset
has a liquidating dividend which can be yh > 0 in the "good" case or yl = 0 in the
"bad" case. The probability of high payo is denoted by πt, the probability of low
payo 1− πt. The fundamental variable zt is the log odds ratio of receiving the high
payo:
zt ≡ ln πt
1− πt , (3.1)
where zt > 0 indicates πt > 12 and zt < 0 indicates πt < 12 .
The fundamental value z can stay unchanged from t− 1 to t with probability β0
or it can increase or decrease by +1 or −1 with probabilities β+ and β− respectively,
with β− = β+ = 1−β02 . Whenever a change in z occurs, all agents receive the same
informative signal st = ±1 which is correct (i.e. st = ∆zt) with probability τ > 12 or
incorrect (st = −∆zt) with probability 1− τ .
πt is calculated from the actual zt by the inverse of (3.1):4
πt =
1
e−zt + 1
(3.2)
Besides investing in A, agents can invest in a riskfree asset B, yielding a payo of
r for each unit invested, where we assume yh > 2r > 0, such that the expected payo
is larger for the risky asset than for the riskfree asset at π = 1
2
.
With no discounting the fair price of A for risk neutral investors would be
pft = πtyh =
1
e−zt + 1
yh. (3.3)
4Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are a way to transform a zt ∈] − ∞; +∞[ to the interval [0; 1] of valid
probabilities. It allows us to let zt follow a random walk process without generating unfeasible values
of πt.
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As agents are risk averse in our model the fair paying willingness p∗t will be lower
than pf . It will be calculated below in Section 3.3.1.
3.2.2 Agents
The model is populated by n generations of agents. Each generation consists of a
continuum of agents with mass 1 and should be thought of as a generation of traders
in the market under consideration and not as a generation in a demographic sense.
Thus, an "old" or "experienced" trader is one who entered the market long ago and
had much time to collect experience in trading the related asset, whereas a "young"
or "inexperienced" trader cannot look back on a trading history in that particular
market. In total there is a mass of n possible traders in the world. Each time step one
generation enters the world and one is leaving it, therefore each generation lives for n
time periods. They start each period with the same endowment W which is supposed
to be some regular income from other activities. They can now form a portfolio which
is liquidated at the end of the period. The liquidation proceedings are not storable
and are therefore consumed immediately.5 For the sake of simplicity, agents do not
discount future payos.
All agents are risk-averse and have CARA utility functions of the style
U(χt) ≡ −e−ρχt (3.4)
with a constant coecient of risk aversion ρ > 0 across generations and χt = xAtpAt +
rxBt being the cumulated returns from both the risky and the riskfree asset at the
end of period t where xAt, xBt and pAt are the amounts of assets A and B held and
the price of A in period t.
5One advantage of this setting is that we avoid inconsistencies of consumption in the rst period
an agent enters the market.
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3.2.3 Non-Strategic Behavior
Until Chapter 4, where strategic trading is addressed, traders do not act strate-
gically when making their decision, i.e. they do not actively exploit the potential
weakness of others. We refer to this as the basic case. When examining strategic
behavior in Chapter 4 we will nd that there are excess returns to be realized by so-
phisticated traders if they manage to act strategically. Nevertheless the basic case is
suitable for two situations: First, it describes the dynamics if information about belief
formation is private, that is agents have no information about the belief formation
strategies of other agents. In the model based on the basic case agents simply assume
other agents use the same heuristics as themselves. Second, even when relaxing this
assumption, the basic case holds if traders do not have any market power. Whenever
they are acting as atomistic price-takers in a market, there is no room for strategically
inuencing the price as others would free ride on that occasion. I.e. sophisticated
traders are caught in a public good situation where they wait for others to invest
in order to move prices in the desired direction, and in equilibrium no one is willing
to do so. In the expanded setting in Chapter 4 strategic trading takes place, but
collusion or individual market power is necessary in that case.
Also, inter-period saving is not possible, that is the returns from investing are
perishable and agents have to consume them at the end of each period. Thus they do
not worry about balancing their lifetime utility paths. However, at the beginning of
the period there is no credit constraint to the agents and they can borrow to nance
their portfolios, where debts have to be repayed during the consumption phase at
the end of the same period. Altogether as a result agents behave short-sighted in
this Chapter and simply maximize the expected utility of their portfolio returns in a
myopic way each period t. In Chapter 4 the restrictions are relaxed and agents can
set their demands strategically and in a dynamic way, considering future eects of
their choices.
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3.2.4 Timing
Each period t consists of three steps:
First, generations receive their endowment W and the fundamental signal st is
revealed to all generations. The signal suggests whether the fundamental value z for
high asset payo has increased, decreased or stood unchanged. st = 0 indicates no
change in the log odds ratio (this will be called "no signal" further on), st = +1
suggests an increase of z by one (if it wasn't a wrong signal) and st = −1 a decrease
of z by one ("positive" and "negative" signal further on). If a signal arrives, it is used
to update bs in a Bayesian way. A signal is only sent when a change occurs, thus no
signal means there is no necessity to update bs. Also, traders observe the recent price
change ∆pt 6 and interpret this as a signal of π to form their bm.
Second, generations form beliefs about the expected payo Eyt and maximize
EU(x) accordingly, yielding a demand xit of A for each period and each generation.
The remainder Wit − xit is invested in the riskfree asset B. A market clearing price
pt is calculated.
Third, the actual zt is revealed and a payo yt is drawn according to the probability
πt corresponding to zt. All agents receive their liquidation returns and consume them.
At the end of the turn all generations are getting older, the oldest generation drops
out and a new generation of traders enters the market with initial beliefs calculated
from the observation of the recently revealed zt and ∆pt. Figure 3.1 graphically shows
the timing of each period.
3.2.5 Belief Formation
To capture the idea that traders regard direct signals as well as market observation
in a momentum manner when forming their beliefs about the fundamental value of
a risky asset, we consider the belief bit as the probability assigned to high payo by
generation i at time t. It is composed out of two components bsit (signal component)
and bmit (momentum component). The intermediate, non rational momentum compo-
6The exact denition of ∆pt is given in the following section.
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Figure 3.1: Model Timing
nent (bm) is motivated by the consideration "If I look at the history, I would judge the
probability for high payo to be...". The intermediate signal component (bs) belongs
to the thought "If I interpret the signal I received, I would judge the probability of high
payo to be...". To compute the nal belief b, both intermediate beliefs are regarded
with weights depending on the age of traders.7
3.2.5.1 Signal Belief bs
The direct signal observation belief bs is deduced by updating the previous value
πt−1 if a new signal arrives. πt−1 in turn can be exactly inferred by the observation
of zt−1 at the end of period t− 1.
The corresponding estimated zt is:
Es(zt) = zt−1 + st(2τt − 1) (3.5)
We have,
bsi = E
s(πt) =
(
τ
1
e−(zt−1+st) + 1
+ (1− τ) 1
e−(zt−1−st) + 1
)
s2t
+(1− s2t )
1
e−zt−1 + 1
. (3.6)
Equation 3.6 guarantees that bs stays unchanged if no signal arrives (st = 0), and
is updated if st 6= 0.
7Time indices are dropped if not necessary.
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3.2.5.2 Momentum Belief bm
The momentum belief bm is deducted from the observation of a possible recent
price change, which is (incorrectly) interpreted as a signal on the log odds ratio of
the asset. We dene
∆pt ≡ pt−1 − pt−2. (3.7)
Please note that ∆pt describes the change in p from the pre-preceding to the preceding
period and not from the preceding to the actual period! This is for the sake of
conformity in time indices in further equations.
In a typical momentum manner, estimates of fundamentals are linearly increasing
in former price shifts. Therefore the point estimate for zt, denoted by ẑt, is
ẑt = zt−1 + λ∆pt. (3.8)
Accordingly,
bmt = E
m
i (πt) =
1
e−(zt−1+λ∆pt) + 1
, (3.9)
with the momentum intensity parameter λ > 0 describing the strength of the momen-
tum eect. For simplicity, we will set λ = 1 for the following sections. All results will
be independent of the precise value of λ, except the divergence/convergence behavior
of cycles. In Chapter 4 we will study the impact of λ on dynamic optimization of
rational agents exploiting the less experienced traders.
3.2.5.3 Belief Composition
The nal belief bi of generation i is composed out of bs and bm in dependence on
its age i. Younger generations are unexperienced in signal observation and rely to a
higher degree on trend following strategies represented by the momentum belief bm,
with the youngest generation i = 1 being totally momentum driven and only regard-
ing the momentum belief bm. Older generations possess more "rational capabilities"
and set their focus on bs, with the oldest generation i = n being perfectly rational
and only regarding the signal belief bs.
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In general the nal belief is formed as follows:
bit =
1
n− 1
(
(n− i)bmt + (i− 1)bst
)
(3.10)
Each period, each generation is advancing to a more mature state, such that gen-
eration i becomes generation i + 1. During this process, generations change their
method of updating insofar as they now put a higher weight on signal observation
and a lower weight on the observation of price changes. The oldest generation simply
drops out and a new generation enters at position i = 1, whose initial beliefs are
calculated by the observed zt−1 and ∆pt.
Keep in mind that this is a behavioral model and thus an agent is making the
same systematic error (namely including the momentum term in his belief formation)
again and again. His internal model of the world is inexible in this sense and any
deviations of the price from his predicted values are assigned to some noise and
not to the quality of the own heuristic. A justication could be that people tend to
repress wrong predictions they made and that they seem to lter arriving information
according to its t to their initial beliefs. This eect is known as "anchoring" or
"belief perseverance" and is well described in psychological and behavioral economics
literature.8 Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979, p. 2099) describe some of the underlying
cognitive mechanisms involved in such biases:
"...there is considerable evidence that people tend to interpret subsequent
evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs. The biased assimilation
processes underlying this eect may include a propensity to remember the
strengths of conrming evidence but the weaknesses of disconrming evi-
dence, to judge conrming evidence as relevant and reliable, but discon-
rming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept conrming
evidence at face value while scrutinizing disconrming evidence hypercrit-
8See for example Rabin (1996) for a detailed description of "anchoring" and generally an extensive
compilation of psychological phenomena relevant for economics.
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ically. With conrming evidence, we suspect that both lay and professional
scientists rapidly reduce the complexity of the information and remember
only a few well-chosen supportive impressions. With disconrming evi-
dence, they continue to reect upon any information that suggests less
damaging 'alternative interpretations'. Indeed, they may even come to
regard the ambiguities and conceptual aws in the data opposing their hy-
potheses as somehow suggestive of the fundamental correctness of those
hypotheses. Thus, completely inconsistent or even random data - when
'processed' in a suitable biased fashion - can maintain or even reinforce
one's preconceptions."
In the case of nancial markets the trader might justify himself by seeing the asset
as a long-term or growth investment, which - although it payed poor dividends today
- will exhibit strongly increasing returns in future periods.9 For a further discussion
of this issue with regard to economic modeling see for example Barberis, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998, p.319f).
However, the new feature of our approach is that agents' heuristics do improve
over time. In the model presented here, this happens in a exogenous way. But one
could well think of models where the size of estimation errors determines the speed
of the improvement of the belief formation process. Qualitatively the results should
be the same in the latter case, thus we stick to the mechanism described here to keep
the model trackable.
9This would match the observation that growth markets - where the mentioned psychological
eect would work best - seem to be more susceptible for bubble behavior than well established
markets with lower expected growth.
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3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Demand and Asset Price Formation
For the formation of asset prices we use a standard approach where agents can
choose between a risky asset (the asset A under consideration) and a riskfree asset B.
Agents estimate the liquidation value of the assets, where the certain payo of one
unit of B is r and the payo of one unit of A is believed to be yh with probability bi
and yl with probability 1− bi.
Each generation i maximizes the expected utility of its portfolio with respect to
xit, the amount of A bought at time t:
EUit(xit) = −bite−ρ(r(W−xitpt)+xityh) − (1− bit)e−ρ(r(W−xitpt)) (3.11)
The FOC is:
∂
∂xit
= −bitρ(rpt − yh)e−ρ(r(W−xitpt)+xityh) − (1− bit)ρ(rpt)e−ρ(r(W−xitpt)) = 0 (3.12)
This yields
xit =
1
ρyh
ln
bit(yh − rpt)
(1− bit)rpt . (3.13)
Aggregating demand and equalling to the supply of 0 results in
pt =
Ktyh
r(1 + Kt)
(3.14)
with Kt ≡ n
√ Q
i bitQ
i(1−bit) .
Equation 3.14 can be seen as a general pricing function for two-asset models with
CARA utility functions and heterogeneous beliefs about high payo probabilities.
The variable K can be interpreted as the market sentiment. It directly determines
the nal market price p in our model and will be very useful for the proofs in the
following sections. A K > 1 means the overall belief of all market participants in
high payos is positive (larger than 1
2
), thus p > y
2
; K < 1 indicates negative overall
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belief implicating p < y
2
. Very high K's represent strong overall belief in high future
payos, leading to a price of yh for K → ∞, very low K's represent low aggregate
beliefs in high future returns, thus yielding a price of 0 for A if K → 0, as nobody
wants to hold A if its expected value is 0.
Note also that even if K > 1, still a majority of traders can assign probabilities
of b < 1
2
to a high payo if this is counterbalanced by extremely high beliefs of the
minority. For example a single private belief of 0+ ε or 1− ε for ε → 0 leads to a price
of 0 resp. yh
r
because the agent under consideration then is willing to sell short or
buy the whole market if not counterbalanced by an appropriately extreme opposing
belief of another agent.
For n = 1 or with homogeneous beliefs and arbitrary n we get the pricing function
for homogeneous traders as a special case, then it follows that Kt = bt1−bt and equation
3.14 simplies to pt = btyhr . Therefore, the fully rational price for correctly informed
risk averse agents with a utility function described above would be
p∗t ≡
πtyh
r
=
yh
r(e−zt + 1)
. (3.15)
We dene a sentiment function K(bi) which describes the market sentiment de-
pendent on bi if b−i (i.e. all bj with j 6= i) are held x:
K(bi|b−i) ≡ n
√
bi
∏
j 6=i bj
(1− bi)
∏
j 6=i(1− bj)
(3.16)
Figure 3.2 depicts three examples of the sentiment function K(bi|b−i) for high,
neutral and low b−i (b−i >, =, < 12). Depending on other agents beliefs the belief of i
has to be more or less extreme to shift overall sentiment in the other direction than
suggested by the majority. The more extreme bi, the faster overall K is shifted away
from the sentiment of the majority.
Thanks to the CARA utility functions, equations 3.13 and 3.14 are independent
of W , that means we face the same myopic decision problem each period even if we
allow for accumulating wealth over periods.
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Figure 3.2: Sentiment function for n=5 dependent on belief bi, with be-
liefs b−i of all other agents j 6= i kept x at 0.5 (bold line),
0.4 (dashed line) and 0.6 (dotted line). Depending on b−i,
i's belief has to be higher or lower in order to yield overall
positive sentiment (K > 1).
3.3.1.1 Properties of the Demand, Price and Sentiment Functions
We now want to state some properties of the demand function (equation 3.13),
the price function (equation 3.14) and the sentiment function (equation 3.16). This
properties help us to determine the eventual eect of a shock to fundamental value
to the market price of asset A. A shock is dened as a change in the fundamental
variable zt dened in Section 3.2.1 by +1 (positive shock) or -1 (negative shock). The
causality works from πt via the signal st and individual beliefs bi to market sentiment
Kt and nally to price pt as depicted in Figure 3.3.
The price function (3.14) is downward sloping in r and upward sloping in K and
y, as
∂p
∂r
= − Kyh
r2(1 + K)
< 0, (3.17)
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Figure 3.3: Causality from fundamental shock to market price.
∂p
∂K
=
yh
r(1 + K)2
> 0 ∀r > 0; K, yh > 0, (3.18)
∂2p
∂K2
= − 2yh
r(1 + K)3
< 0 ∀r > 0; K, yh > 0, (3.19)
and
∂p
∂yh
=
K
r(1 + K)
> 0 ∀r > 0; K > 0. (3.20)
Individual demand xi is downward sloping in p and upward sloping in bi for prices
smaller than yh
r
:
∂xi
∂p
= − 1
ρp(yh − rp) < 0 ∀ p <
yh
r
, (3.21)
∂xi
∂bi
=
1
ρyhbi(1− bi) > 0 ∀ 0 < bi < 1; yh, ρ > 0. (3.22)
Given the rational price of p = πyh
r
, individual demand would be positive if
bi(yh − rp)
(1− bi)rp > 1, (3.23)
⇔ bi > π. (3.24)
The slope of market sentiment K with respect to bi is determined by
∂K
∂bi
=
K
nbi(1− bi) . (3.25)
This is positive for all bi ∈]0; 1[. Also:
∂2K
∂b2i
=
K(1− n + 2nbi)
n2b2i (1− bi)2
(3.26)
⇒ ∂
2K
∂b2i
= 0 ⇔ bi = n− 1
2n
. (3.27)
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For smaller bi, K is bent rightwards, for larger bi leftwards in bi. In any case, for
bi >
1
2
, K(bi) is leftward bend as equation 3.27 is always smaller than 12 .
The total dierential of K with respect to b is thus
dK =
n∑
i=1
∂K
∂bi
dbi. (3.28)
For the proofs of under- and overpricing following in the next section we state
estimations for the change in bi's if a fundamental shock arrives. For that, suppose
that the probability πt−1 for high payo last period was 12 , i.e. we faced an asset with
equal high/low payo-probability, and suppose further that the market was stable
for at last two periods, i.e. no momentum is observed. Then, if a (correct/incorrect)
fundamental signal arrives corresponding to a shift in π by ∆π, generation i's belief
is changing according to:
∆bit = ± i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1). (3.29)
For a proof see appendix C.
3.3.2 Existence of Bubbles
Using the results of the last section, we now analyze the impact of a positive fun-
damental shock on the price path in our model.10 We will show that a single positive
shock to z (and thus to π) and an according positive signal will lead to underpricing
immediately after the observation of the shock, to an overshooting price afterwards,
to some periods of overpricing later on, and then to an endogenous breakdown of the
asset pricing bubble and some more periods of underpricing. This cycle is repeated
with diminishing amplitude until it converges to the new "fair" price dened by the
altered π.
During the cycle, young generations lose money by buying when prices are too
high and old generations win money by selling short on high prices. The market will
10Think of a shock to the protability of the asset, e.g. the arrival of a new production technology
that increases expected payos.
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predominantly be held by young generations when prices fall and by old generations
when prices rise. The overall lifetime performance of a trader depends mainly on the
time he enters the market. If prices are low at that point in time, she is likely to
obtain an overall gain from trading, if prices are high she will probably lose money.
Because the model displays complex dynamics as current beliefs are inuenced by
all former beliefs from past periods via the momentum term, it is not possible to pro-
vide proofs for price paths in any situation with arbitrary sequences of shocks. Never-
theless it is feasible to analytically characterize price paths under certain conditions.
Then we can show exemplary how bubbles arise in an initially fair priced markets
and how prices fade into the new stable state only after a number of mispricing-cycles
after a shock.
To set up formal proofs, we restrict ourselves to a situation where a formerly fair
priced market is hit by exactly one shock. The situation we have in mind is the arrival
of a new technology, e.g. the information technologies in the late 90s, and its impact
on the market. In Chapter 4 we will model more complex price paths with several
shocks. This will be done with the help of numerical simulations and we will show
that bubbles can overlap and intensify such that prices display strong excess volatility.
For the one-shock-case we assume a situation at time t where πt = 12 and there is
no momentum in the market, i.e. the price p was constant for at least the last two
periods. This implies that all traders beliefs about πt are correct in this initial state,
i.e. bit = πt = 12 , ∀i. Thus Kt = 1 and price pt is equal to p∗t . Moreover is follows
that all generations hold zero units of the risky asset.
First we will give the intuitions and informal proofs for under- and overpricing
in period t and t + 1 respectively, and we deduce limits for the change in K when a
shock hits the formerly stable market (Lemma 3.1). Later we will state formal proofs
for under- and overpricing based on the estimations of ∆K and ∆p (Propositions 3.1
and 3.2).
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3.3.2.1 Intuition for Underpricing in Period t
In the situation described above, the risky asset will be underpriced compared to
the fully rational price in the rst period following a positive shock to the fundamental
variable. The intuition for this is as follows:
Consider a single shock ∆zt to the fundamental variable z and a corresponding
change of π by ∆π (see equation 3.2). Accordingly, traders receive a signal st, which
is assumed to be correct.11 As p was constant the last periods, bm obviously does not
change at time t, but bs increases and thus total bi for generation i rises by ∆bi (as
dened by equation 3.29) due to the signal st.12 For young generations the increase in
b is very small (or even zero for generation i = 1) because they overweigh bm over bs,
whereas it is high for old generations, with the oldest generation i = n incorporating
the full eect of the increase in bs in their bn. Clearly, the new price pt will be above
pt−1 (as almost all generations strictly increase their beliefs) and below p∗t , as only
the oldest generation increases its belief to the fully rational level. In other words,
there will be underpricing in period t. Old generations will accumulate the risky asset
as their demand will rise more strongly while young generations will sell it short, as
they falsely assume it is too expensive.
3.3.2.2 Intuition for Price Overshooting in Period t + 1
After pt has formed in a way that clears the market, the true zt is revealed to
the traders. This has an eect on the signal beliefs bs, as the uncertainty about zt
is dissolved, thus bs rises to πt. Also the basis for the estimation of bm changes from
zt−1 to zt. But bm is even further increased by the observation of the positive price
change in the previous period. As a consequence, overall b will at least be equal to
πt and is strictly higher than πt for all generations i < n because they care for bm.
Therefore, generational demand for the fair price of p∗t would be zero for generation n
and positive for all generations i < n (see equation 3.24). As net supply is zero, this is
11If it was false, the rst direction in the price path would be wrong. Nevertheless a bubble would
arise later as the true value of z is revealed at the end of the period.
12A proof can be found in Appendix C.
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impossible and price pt must rise above p∗t . In other words there will be overshooting
of prices in period t + 1.
As the maximal slope 1
4
of π(z) is reached for z = 0, the increase in bit+1 is bounded
by:13
∆bit+1 <
n− i
4(n− 1)(∆zt + ∆pt+1) +
i− 1
n− 1∆b
s
t+1. (3.30)
It is particulary high for young generations, as they are heavily aected by the
strongly positive momentum part. As their beliefs will now "overtake" the beliefs
of old generations, they will accumulate the risky asset in this period whereas old
generations will sell it at the new (and rationally too high) equilibrium price.
Intuition for Further Periods
In the subsequent period t + 2, bs does not change anymore, as no new signal
arrives and all fundamental information is already incorporated to all bsi 's. The sole
changes in beliefs will now stem from changes in bm:
∆bit+2 <
n− i
4(n− 1)∆pt+2 −
n− i
4(n− 1)∆pt+1 (3.31)
Note that, given bs and z are constant now, an increase in p at time t + 2 only
occurs if the change in prices was larger in the preceding period than in the pre-
preceding period, i.e. if ∆pt+2 > ∆pt+1. Therefore, to show that p will again increase
in period t + 2 it is sucient to prove the increase in ∆p in period t + 2 relative to
that in period t + 1. We will do that below in Proposition 3.3.
3.3.2.3 Formal Proofs for Under- and Overpricing
We will now set up a lemma that denes the lower and upper bounds of changes
in market sentiment K in the rst period after the arrival of a shock. It will be used
in the successive proofs.
13Recall equations 3.2, 3.9 and 3.10.
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Lemma 3.1 In a situation at time t where all traders have neutral beliefs about πt
and beliefs are correct, i.e. bit = πt = 12 ≡ b ∀i, and p was constant for at least the
last two periods, it holds that:
2∆π(2τ − 1) < ∆Kt < ∆π(2τ − 1)1
2
− 2∆π2(2τ − 1)2 . (3.32)
Proof
From equations 3.25, 3.28 and 3.29 and respecting the fact that
bit = πt ∀i at the beginning of the period and that K(bi) is convex for bi > 12 by
equation 3.26, it follows that Kt will increase at least by
∆Kt >
n∑
i=1
(
∂K
∂bi
∣∣∣
bit
· i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1)
)
(3.33)
=
n∑
i=1
(i− 1)Kt∆π(2τ − 1)
n(n− 1)bit(1− bit) (3.34)
=
Kt∆π(2τ − 1)
2b(1− b) . (3.35)
As Kt = 1 and b = 12 , it follows:
∆Kt > 2∆π(2τ − 1). (3.36)
Because K(b) is convex, we also can deduct an upper bound for ∆Kt by assuming
the highest possible slope in the sentiment function:
∆Kt <
n∑
i=1
(
∂K
∂bi
∣∣∣
bit+∆bit
· i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1)
)
(3.37)
=
n∑
i=1
(i− 1)K∆π(2τ − 1)
n(n− 1)(bit + ∆bit)(1− bit −∆bit) , (3.38)
where ∆bit denotes the increase in the beliefs of the particular generation.
Another (less strict) upper bound can be derived by replacing all changes of signal
beliefs by their maximal possible increases ∆bn:
∆Kt <
n∑
i=1
(
∂K
∂bi
∣∣∣
bnt
· i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1)
)
(3.39)
=
n∑
i=1
(i− 1)K∆π(2τ − 1)
n(n− 1)(bit + ∆bnt)(1− bit −∆bnt) . (3.40)
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Although equation 3.40 is less strict than equation 3.38, it is more useful as we
now can collapse the sum. With K = 1, b = 1
2
and (3.29) it follows that
∆Kt <
∆π(2τ − 1)
2(1
2
+ ∆π(2τ − 1))(1
2
−∆π(2τ − 1)) (3.41)
=
∆π(2τ − 1)
1
2
− 2∆π2(2τ − 1)2 . (3.42)
2
The next lemma states the rst aftershock-period price change triggered by the
arrival of a positive shock. It will help to determine conditions for bubble formation
later on.
Lemma 3.2 Given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1, p rises by less than
y
4r
∆π(2τ−1)
1
2
−2∆π2(2τ−1)2 in period t.
Proof
As p(K) is concave, we can dene the upper bound ∆pt in period t as follows:
∆pt <
∂p
∂K
∣∣∣
Kt=1
·∆Kt. (3.43)
From equations 3.18 and 3.42 it follows:
∆pt <
y
4r
∆π(2τ − 1)
1
2
− 2∆π2(2τ − 1)2 . (3.44)
2
Note also that the change of the rational price p∗ in period t is
∆p∗t =
∆πyh
r
. (3.45)
We can now use the lemmas to set up propositions stating under- and overpricing
following a positive fundamental shock.
We start by stating underpricing in the rst period after the arrival of a positive
shock.14
14All following statements have to be inverted for the case of a negative shock.
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Proposition 3.1 Given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1, there will be
underpricing in the rst period t after the arrival of a positive fundamental shock:
Proof
Underpricing occurs if the increase in p is smaller than in p∗. Using equations 3.44
and 3.45, this is the case if
y
4r
∆π(2τ − 1)
0.5− 2∆π2(2τ − 1)2 <
∆πyh
r
, (3.46)
which is equivalent to:
|∆π| <
√
6− 4τ
4(2τ − 1) . (3.47)
As |∆π| = 0.231 given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1,15 and the
maximum value for
√
6−4τ
4(2τ−1) is ≈ 0.35 for τ = 1,16 there will always be underpricing in
period t.
2
Similar to Proposition 3.1 we derive a condition for ∆pt < 12∆p∗t , which will later
help to show overpricing in the third period after the arrival of a shock:
Corollary 3.1 Given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1, actual price pt
increases less than half as much as the rational price p∗t in period t, if ∆π <
√
2−2τ
2(2τ−1) .
Stated dierently: ∆pt+1 < 12(p∗t − p∗t−1) if ∆π <
√
2−2τ
2(2τ−1) .
Proof
Analogous to proof of Proposition 3.1 with an additional factor 1
2
on the right
hand side.
2
15Note that by equation 3.2, the initial value π = 12 changes to 0.269 or 0.731 if z is shifted by ±1.
16A smaller τ leads to an even larger right hand side of equation 3.47, thus τ = 1 is the most
critical value. This is conrmed by intuition: A less reliable signal would lead to lower increases in
bs and thus to even lower prices.
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Corollary 3.1 provides only a sucient and not a necessary condition for the
statement that rst period price increases will be less than half the increase in rational
prices. For τ ≤ 9
10
it is fullled for a standard unit shock to z, for τ ≤ 8
10
it is already
satised for the whole range of possible shock sizes.17
Now we state overpricing in the second period after the arrival of the positive
shock:
Proposition 3.2 Given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1, there will be
overpricing of the risky asset in period t + 1.
Proof
To proof overpricing in the situation under consideration, note that
pt+1 > p
∗
t+1 (3.48)
has to hold. This is equivalent to
Kt+1 >
πt+1
1− πt+1 . (3.49)
From the denition of K on page 56 it follows that Proposition 3.2 holds if and only
if bit+1 ≥ πt+1 ∀i and ∃i s.t. bit+1 > πt+1:18
As ∀i < n : bsit+1 = πt = πt+1 and bmit+1 > πt, and ∃i : bit+1 ∈ ]bst+1; bmt+1], this holds
true.
2
After stating that there is underpricing in the rst period following a positive
shock and price overshooting in the second, we now come to our main proposition,
namely the description of the total price path following a shock to the fundamental
variable.
17Intuition and numerical simulations show that Corollary 3.1 in fact holds for the whole parameter
range of τ and ∆z.
18This says that the odds ratio for all traders is at least as high as the rational odds ratio, with at
least one trader having a strictly higher odds ratio than the rational one. Recall also equation 3.16.
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Proposition 3.3 Given the initial situation described in Lemma 3.1, at least for
∆π <
√
2−2τ
2(2τ−1) an asset pricing bubble will arise and deate again after a single positive
shock ∆π and an according signal with precision τ arrive at period t.
Proof
To prove the emergence of a pricing bubble, we will describe the development of
the asset price p after a positive observed shock at the beginning of period t.
1st period after shock, time t: Underpricing
As stated in Corollary 3.1, ∆pt will be smaller than 12∆p∗t , and underpricing will
occur in the rst period after the observed positive shock.
2 nd period after shock, time t + 1: Overpricing
As shown in Proposition 3.2, period t+1 exhibits overpricing, thus pt+1 > p∗t+1 = p∗t
and, combining Corollary 3.1 with underpricing in period t and overpricing in period
t + 1:
∆pt+2 = pt+1 − pt > ∆pt+1. (3.50)
In words, the price increases more from period t to period t+1 than it increases from
period t− 1 (the initial price) to period t.
3 rd period after shock, time t + 2: Overpricing continues
As the bs stay constant from period t + 1 to t + 2 because all uncertainty about
z was already resolved at the end of period t when zt was revealed, and z did not
change later, only bm will matter for the overall belief formation of the generations.
bmt+2 will increase compared to bmit+1 if and only if ∆pt+2 (which determines bmt+2) is
larger than ∆pt+1 (which determines bmit+1). Because this holds true by equation 3.50,
bi increase for all generations except generation i = n (for which it stays unchanged),
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thus K increases and subsequently p rises again and ∆pt+3 is positive.
m th period after shock, time t + m: Breakdown of Bubble
As the price function is asymptotically reaching yh
r
for K → +∞ and ∆pt+1 > 0,
it is obvious that there exists a period m, such that: ∆pm < ∆pm−1. Thus in period
m, p will decrease if no other signal arrives.19 Another way to see this is to examine
generational demand which increases less and less fast for high p even if beliefs are
rising further (see equation 3.22).
Further periods, time t+m+1, t+m+2, ...: Pricing cycle with diminishing amplitude
The decrease will be small in the rst period t+m and will trigger an accelerating
downward cascade via the momentum term, as ∂p
∂K
increases with falling K and also
the slope of π(ẑ) is higher for ẑ close to 1
2
. By the same argument as before, the
decline in p will smoothen out when p is approaching the minimal price of zero, and
another upward cascade will start. Depending on the value of λ, the cycle attens
out faster or slower, and p nally converges to the stable value p∗.
2
3.4 Numerical Simulation of Price Paths
Although it was possible to prove that bubbles and a mispricing-cycle arise fol-
lowing a single exogenous shock, it is hardly possible to state a general closed form
solution for exact values of an entire price path over more than a couple of periods.
This is due to the price dependency on all former prices and beliefs. Nevertheless it
is easily possible to calculate price paths for given parameter settings. To visualize
the dynamics and get a better impression of the bubble behavior explained above, we
19Actually, simulations show that in the whole parameter range it holds that m = t + 3, that
means already in t + 4 prices are reverting again.
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ran a couple of numerical simulations to calculate explicit price path developments
after shocks. The simulations also allow us to track the portfolio dynamics of single
traders in the market and to conrm related statements made above.
In Section 3.4.1 we describe simulations for the case of one exogenous shock ar-
riving at the market. We will nd the behavior described in Proposition 3.3 again,
namely one period of underpricing, a phase of overpricing and attening pricing cycles
around the new fair price.
In Chapter 4 we also run simulations for the case of multiple shocks arriving at
the market at several times. This helps us to illustrate long run pricing behavior and
excess volatility displayed by our model.
3.4.1 The One Shock Case
As a rst case we simulate a price path related to the situation described above
in Lemma 3.1, i.e. a single positive fundamental shock hitting a formerly balanced
market. The concrete parameter specication for the following gures is:20
number of generations n = 5,
precision of signal τ = 7
10
,
payo of risk free asset r = 1,
high payo of risky asset yh = 3,
coecient of risk aversion ρ = 1
2
,
momentum intensity parameter λ = 2.
The other specications are as stated in Lemma 3.1, that is agents' beliefs before
the arrival of the shock are correct and equal to 1
2
and there is no momentum in the
market at the time the shock arrives. Therefore, the price path described below for the
given parameter values exactly corresponds to the path described by the theoretical
analysis in the last section.
20We tested the model behavior with several other specications and the predicted patterns
emerged in any case.
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Figure 3.4: Simulated price path for one shock.
3.4.1.1 Price Path
The simulation ran for 20 periods with the shock and the signal arriving in period
4.21 The resulting price path is displayed in Figure 3.4. The rational price before
the shock is πyh
r
= 1.5 and rises to 2.19 after the shock. The expected under- and
overpricing as well as the cyclical pricing behavior afterwards can well be seen in the
gure.
As stated in the intuition arguments in Section 3.3.2, we expect that young traders
are losing money on average, as they buy the market in its downturns, whereas old
generations prot by selling their shares when prices are high and by buying when
prices are falling.
In our simulation we can track the amount of stock held by each generation at any
time. The results for the specication given above is depicted in Figure 3.5, where
the demand of generation 1 (youngest) and 5 (oldest) are shown. Next to that the di-
vergence of p∗t from pt is drawn, positive values indicate underpricing, negative values
21The signal is correctly reecting the change in fundamentals in the depicted simulation.
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Figure 3.5: Generational demand and divergence of the rational price
from the actual price. High positive divergence means the
asset is underpriced and vice versa. Demand of the oldest
generation (i = 5) is correlated with underpricing whereas
the youngest generation (i = 1) buys when the asset is over-
priced.
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overpricing. As predicted by our considerations above, the old generation exhibits
excess demand when prices are relatively low, whereas young generations demand
the risky asset when its price is relatively high. To estimate the size of losses/gains
made by young/old generations we tracked the per-period expected returns for each
generation. From the numerical model we calculate the average gains/losses of each
generation of traders and we nd that indeed the young generations lose on average
whereas the older win. However, the dierences are especially dramatic when there is
substantial mispricing, i.e. in the rst periods after the shock. In Table 3.1, the end
of period expected wealth and period utility is listed for all generations for the period
where the bubble reaches its top (period 6 in Figure 3.4). Also, the relative expected
wealth with respect to the highest reached expected wealth (that of generation 5) is
denoted. Relative gains and losses are substantial in this one shock numerical exam-
ple and with many shocks as in Section 4.1 they would even increase, as mispricing
increases if bubbles overlap and add to each other.
Table 3.1: Example of one period performance of generations
Generation # end of period wealth period utility in % of top wealth
1 0.8657 -0.4207 78%
2 0.9488 -0.3872 85%
3 1.0119 -0.3635 91%
4 1.0640 -0.3450 95%
5 1.1095 -0.3297 100%
In our model momentum traders lose money, and experienced investors prot from
their existence. Other models with heterogeneous investors often run into troubles
justifying the survival of non-rational traders in the long run. One justication put
forward by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) is the idea that ir-
rational noise traders generate extra risk for which they are compensated, because
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short sighted and risk averse arbitrageurs cannot bet aggressively against them due
to the risk that the former might push prices even further away from fundamental
values next period. In contrast, there is no need to justify survival of the "momentum
traders" in our model, as they do not remain on the losing side for long, but gradually
switch to the smart camp when getting older.
Thus a trader will have negative expected returns when he is inexperienced and
positive expected returns when he is experienced. The overall actual life time per-
formance mainly depends on the time an agent enters the market in our model. If
he enters it in a phase of severe mispricing (i.e. directly after the arrival of a shock)
he might suer strong losses in his rst periods of life which he will not be able to
compensate later. On the other hand, if he enters in a calm phase and a shock arrives
when he is already experienced, he will prot from the arising price divergence and
his expected lifetime returns will be unusually high.
3.5 Conclusion
In classical asset pricing models, agents are either homogeneous or - if heteroge-
neous - static with respect to their belief formation heuristics. In contrast to that it
seems sensible that complex decision making is a task where experience plays a critical
role and one would expect that agents do better the more experienced they are. This
model captures that idea and explains well known asset pricing puzzles, as over- and
underpricing, bubble behavior and excess volatility in the framework of an overlap-
ping generations model where young traders follow a simple non-rational momentum
strategy and old traders behave as perfect rational decision makers. When getting
older, young traders gain experience and gradually switch to the rational camp.
Moreover it is possible within the model to make predictions as to which traders
hold the market in any particular phase, and in which time of their life-cycle traders
will on average face positive or negative expected returns.
In the next chapter we will examine the case of multiple shocks and we present
an extended version of the model that allows for strategic trading.
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Also in the next chapter, in Section 4.6, an outlook and suggestions for empirical
testing are presented that refer to Chapter 3 as well as to Chapter 4.
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An Extended Model of Asset Pricing
with Heterogeneous Agents
In Chapter 3 we restricted ourselves to the case of one fundamental shock only.
This made it possible to treat the model analytically and clearly showed the basic
mechanics of our model. The intuition for markets with multiple shocks is obvious:
Each shock will generate its own mispricing cycle and these "waves" will interfere
like waves in a physical context and will add to a much more complex price path
with rough and calm periods. It is no longer possible to describe these general paths
analytically, but in this chapter we will present some simulations to get at least some
qualitative insights into a multi-shock environment.
In the previous chapter we also stuck to the assumption that agents are price
takers in the market or that they have no knowledge about other agents decision
making processes. Both assumptions are pretty plausible and should cover the vast
majority of markets we observe. However, in this chapter we want to extend the basic
model to the case of fully informed agents with pricing power. Clearly this changes
the situation considerably as rational traders now will act strategically and will try
to inuence prices in their favor to prot from mispricing. We will nd that bubble
formation persists in principle, that incomes are even more unequally distributed and
that excess volatility rises.
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4.1 The Multi Shock Case
In real asset markets, there are numerous shocks to the fundamental value of an
asset over time. In our model, each shock triggers a bubble and a pricing cycle,
and dierent cycles will overlap if many shocks arrive. In Figure 4.1 a situation
is simulated where shocks arrive with a probability of 10% each period. All other
parameters are as in Section 3.4.1. It is clearly visible that actual prices in principle
follow the rational price, but that they show price overshooting, bubble behavior and
some excess volatility. Later, in Section 4.4.1, we take a closer look at the volume of
excess volatility dependent on the intensity of momentum trading in the market.
The simulation shows that the "waves" of mispricing interfere and sometimes
cancel out each other, whereas on other occasions they amplify each other and lead
to strong moves in the market. Especially when strong down-(or up-)ward momentum
is reinforced by another shock in the same direction, there can be severe crashes (or
increases) in market price followed by periods of extensive mispricing.
Mispricing is most strong for zt around zero due to our process specication where
the changes in πt are the higher the closer zt is to zero.1
Also, the eect of market entrance timing can well be seen in Figure 4.1. Imagine a
trader entering the market at a "calm" time, i.e. a point of time with little momentum,
let's say period 96. He then has a couple of periods with low volatility where he can
gain experience without losing to much money due to mispricing. When the positive
shock nally arrives in period 99, he well be acting rational enough to prot strongly
from the subsequent periods of mispricing. He therefore has a good chance to make
positive overall prots over his life-cycle.
1One criticism of the price path in our simulation was that it follows the rational price path
(and thus the fundamental signals) in time, and does not lead it. One probably would expect the
latter, as nancial markets are said to anticipate future developments. But note that we do not say
anything about the nature of the fundamental shock. If you interpret it not as an direct shock but
as a shock to expectations about the fundamental variables, the simulated price path would indeed
anticipate fundamental changes in future periods.
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Figure 4.1: Simulated price path for multiple shock. Price overshooting
and excess volatility is clearly visible.
Contrary, look at a trader entering the market during volatile times, e.g. at pe-
riod 87. This trader faces the opposite situation, namely high mispricing during her
"learning phase" and lower mispricing during her "earning phase". Thus it is likely
that she will on average lose money over her life-cycle.
For the multi shock case, we again tracked demand of the dierent generations.
In analogy to the one shock case, the corresponding values for the oldest and the
youngest generation are plotted for the rst 40 periods in Figure 4.2. Note that
demand again does not depend on the price level but on the divergence of the fair
price from the actual price.
4.2 Strategic Trading
In the following we will extend our model such that experienced traders do have
information about the behavior of other traders and have sucient market power to
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Figure 4.2: Generational demand and divergence of actual price from
rational price for the multi-shock case.
engage in strategic trading. The dynamics in this case get even more interesting than
in the non-strategic setting, but on the other hand they quickly lead to equations
that are no longer solvable in closed form. It is possible to set up the maximization
problem for the strategically acting rational traders and to formulate rst order condi-
tions. Also, propositions about pricing behavior are possible by solving the equations
numerically for specied parameter settings.
4.2.1 Motivation
Let's consider a market where the experienced, more "rational" traders have suf-
cient market power or can collude to actively exploit the systematic errors made by
inexperienced traders. They are assumed to have full knowledge about the decision
making process of the young traders.
Market power or collusion on the side of experienced traders is necessary to force
the price away from pt. While collusion seems to be unfeasible due to free-rider
eects, there occur situations where some or one of the traders hold a large enough
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share of the market. This might not be the case for an aggregated asset market
but is well possible for single special assets. For example there are many companies
whose shares are concentrated in the hand of one or a few large investors with only a
smaller fraction oating freely. In many of these cases it seems plausible to think of
the large investor as the experienced generation, trying to actively exploit weaknesses
of inexperienced traders. Therefore we should expect the eects described here mainly
in illiquid markets or in single assets, and less frequent in aggregate or very liquid
markets.2
One outcome of the extended model is that strategic trading even amplies mis-
pricing and excess volatility. This point is particulary interesting, as it is counter-
intuitive to the idea that the introduction of additional "rationality" should lead to
less mispricing in the market.
Again we will have to pick out a simple case that on the one side makes clear the
intuition behind this extension, and on the other side does not lead into calculations
too complex to be solved in a meaningful way. Our rst restriction will be that
we only allow for n = 2 generations and two distinct groups of decision strategies.
We therefore keep only pure momentum traders (denoted by M) and pure rational
traders (denoted by R). We also want generations to stay more than 1 period in each
group to allow for intertemporal optimization by rational agents. Therefore we let
each generation stay for two periods in each state and thus set the lifespan of each
trader to 2n = 4, i.e. each generation stays in the momentum group for 2 periods
and then immediately switches to the rational group and stays there for another 2
periods.
4.2.2 Intuition
When optimizing in a dynamic way, rational agents will not only put total weight
on signal beliefs bsRt but will also try to exploit the systematical judgement errors
2For the case of no collusion and no concentration the market behavior will be as in the previous
chapter, as price taking rational investors will not be able to coordinate on strategic prices in a
competitive equilibrium.
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made by inexperienced generations. The intuition for their reasoning is as follows:
Suppose we are in a balanced situation as dened in Lemma 3.1. Now the positive
fundamental shock arrives at time t and let's say the received signal st is correct. Then
prices will rise in period t due to the increase of bsRt. Now there are two eects to be
considered by the rational group R in the rst period after the shock:
1) As R knows that M did not adjust their beliefs properly in response to the
signal, they know thatM will underestimate the value of A. Therefore R can strate-
gically reduce its demand to lower pt, as this decrease will not be fully absorbed by
M, and for a marginal decrease in xRt the gains from lower pt will be higher than
the losses from a smaller xRt. This aects the immediate return at the end of period
t. The optimal resulting price when R considers only this eect is denoted by p̂t and
will be called "myopic exploiting optimum".3
2) As R knows that M will react to momentum in period t + 1 by increasing its
demand and R anticipates that there will be overpricing in t+1, there is an incentive
to create as much momentum as possible in period t to make a maximum gain from
selling the risky asset short next period. This eect is contrary to eect 1, therefore
R will increase its demand such that pt moves above the myopic exploiting optimum
p̂t to a point p̃t ≥ p̂t. It depends on the momentum intensity parameter λ whether
there is a positive shift and whether even p̃t > pt, with pt being the equilibrium price
in the model without strategic trading. The price p̃t is called "dynamic exploiting
optimum".4
In the following we will set up the optimization equations for a strategically acting
generation R. We will rst look at eect (1) and later at eect (2) described above.
3From now on we will take the standpoint of group R, hence "optimal" means optimal from R's
point of view.
4When considering strategic behavior, we treat R as one actor in this chapter, therefore assuming
that rational traders are able to cooperate perfectly. If they do not, it depends on the actual size
and number of agents in this group whether the price impact is large or small.
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4.3 Myopic Exploitation
As a benchmark case we rst consider rational agents who do not care about
future periods but optimize their utility myopically each period. As now only the
rst eect from above will work, we expect the price (compared to the non-exploiting
case under the same conditions) to be lower than in the standard case in periods
where underpricing exists and higher in periods where there is overpricing. To this
benchmark we will later compare optimal prices when rational agents optimize in
a dynamic way. As we are interested in the behavior of prices, and we will nd
that prices and R's demand are directly linked (see equations 4.2 and 4.3 below), we
directly state the maximization problem in terms of p. This saves us the non-linear
transformation from p to xR afterwards.
The rational agent R has to solve
max
p
EUR(p) (4.1)
s.t.
xR = −xM, (4.2)
xM =
1
ρyh
ln
bM(yh − rp)
(1− bR)rp . (4.3)
Equation 4.2 follows from net supply of zero in asset A, equation 4.3 is the optimality
condition stated in Section 3.3.1. The resulting maximization problem and the rst
order condition can be found in Appendix D.
As it is not possible to solve the FOC for p analytically, we have to fall back on
numerical methods to maximize equation 4.1. We use an algorithm based on golden
section search and parabolic interpolation as described in Forsythe, Malcolm and
Moler (1976). This algorithm belongs to the group of constrained search algorithms
and is well suitable because we know that prices outside the open interval ]0; yh
r
[
cannot be enforced by R.5 The algorithm converges fast and with any given precision
to the inner solution of the maximization problem.
Obviously the price will be independent of λ as R ignores future periods at this
5For p → 0 the demand of M rises to innity, for p → yhr to minus innity.
82
Chapter 4
stage of the model. In Figure 4.3 (dashed line, left plot) the price is depicted for
τ = 7
10
and as expected, it is below the non-exploiting price pt.
In the second period the optimal myopic price will be higher than without exploiting
rational agents because now the intuition from above will work the other way round.6
Depending on λ the optimal price will increase in τ . It also increases directly in λ as
the latter determines the extra charge payed for momentum by M. A plot of second
period myopic optimal pricing can also be found in Figure 4.3 (dashed line, right
plot).
In Figure 4.4 the corresponding expected utilities are depicted for dierent λ. Note
that optimizing in a myopic way increases gains for R in period 1, but also decreases
gains in period 2, as the momentum eect is weakened when prices are pushed down
in the rst period. If we dene λ̂ as the λ where myopic optimization yields the same
total expected utility for R than non-strategic optimization, then for λ > λ̂ total
utility is actually higher with no optimization than with myopic optimization. Stated
dierently, if momentum has a very strong impact on the decisions of inexperienced
traders, then experienced traders are worse o if they do myopic strategic optimization
than when they do not act strategically at all.
In the right plot of Figure 4.4 the region where non-strategic trading would be
superior to myopic optimization can clearly be seen. From the plot in the middle it
can be seen, that this comes from the relative losses by neglecting the second period
momentum eect, which for high λ eventually outweighs the constant additional gains
from the rst period.
4.4 Dynamic Optimization
If R considers the consequences of her action in period 1 on prices in period 2
she additionally has to consider the second eect stated in Section 4.2.2. We then
expect prices to be strictly above the myopic maximizing prices for λ > 0, and exactly
matching the former for λ = 0.
6Note that now we have overpricing, thus R strategically reduces its short-selling.
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Figure 4.3: Prices p1 and p2 for dierent λ with no optimization, myopic
and dynamic optimization by rational agents R.
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rational group R.
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Therefore, in period 1 after a positive shock, a dynamically optimizing rational
trader who has one more period to live faces the optimization task:
max
pt
t+1∑
k=t
EUR(xRk, pk, pk−1, pk−2) (4.4)
s.t.
xRk = −xMk = 1
ρyh
ln
bMk(yh − rpk)
(1− bMk)rpk k = t, t + 1, (4.5)
bMt+1 =
1
e−zt−λ(pt−pt−1) + 1
. (4.6)
Thus, given pt−1 the rational trader faces a two dimensional maximization problem
where he has to choose an optimal triple (pt, pt+1, pt+1). pt+1 and pt+1 are the optimal
myopic exploiting prices in period t + 1 for the case that at the end of t the signal st
turns out to have been correct or incorrect.7 Equation 4.5 again represents the market
clearing condition with zero net supply. Equation 4.6 states the anticipated belief of
M in period t + 1 and is important as it determines the demand of non-rational
traders in the second period.
In a dierent notion, in period one (set t ≡ 1) R has to choose xR1 such that her
demand induces a price p̃1 that satises the equation:
∂EUR1(p̃1)
∂p1
+
∂EUR2(p̃1)
∂p1
= 0. (4.7)
The second period marginal ex ante expected utility for a change in p1 can be
found in Appendix D. For the rst period marginal expected utility with respect to
p1, the derivative of equation 4.1, as stated for the myopic case in equation D.2 in
the appendix, can be used as there is no momentum eect in the rst period.
The resulting optimality condition is very complex and cannot be solved in closed
form. But again it is feasible to calculate the marginal expected utilities for given
parameters and then nd the solution of equation 4.7 using numerical solvers. As it
turns out (and is clear by intuition) that marginal expected utility of period 1 with
7Note that the rational exploiting agent optimizes dierently in period t + 1 dependent on the
actual realization of zt and that he chooses myopic optimization in t + 1, as this is his last period to
live. Also, p2 is determined by the choice of p1, thus there is no need to formulate an explicit choice
of p2.
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respect to p1 is downward sloping for prices p1 > p̂1,8 coming from a value of zero
for p = p̂1, and marginal expected utility of period 2 is also downward sloping for
p1 > p̂1 starting from a strictly positive value for p = p̂1 and λ > 0,9 the maximization
problem has a unique solution p̃1 above the myopic optimum p̂1.
Thus, simple incremental increases in p1 and a rening of iteration steps close
to the solutions leads to a fast and accurate convergence to the unique solution p̃1.
Optimized prices depending on λ can be found in Figure 4.3, corresponding expected
utilities in Figure 4.4 (dotted lines). In the case of no momentum (λ = 0), p1 will be
chosen equal to myopic optimization. It will be strictly higher for all positive λ. But
in contrast to λ vs. p2, the relationship of λ and p1 is not a monotonic one, as for
very high λ additional momentum will yield only small additional returns because p2
will then anyway be close to the maximum, such that costs in period 1 will outweigh
gains in period 2. However, this can not be seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 as the scale
of λ is too small there and this eect only takes place for very high λ.
Expected utility goes down in period 1 for increasing λ as prices are chosen higher
to take advantage of the stronger momentum eect. For the same reasons as above,
this relationship is non-monotonic. In contrast, expected utility of period 2 rises
monotonically in λ as well as total expected utility. Note that with respect to total
expected utility, dynamic optimization is always superior to both myopic and no
optimization, as it takes into account both the rst period pricing eect and the
second period momentum eect and it guaranties that rst period relative gains
outweigh second period relative losses in any case.
4.4.1 Excess Volatility
In numerical treatments one can relax the requisitions on the starting conditions
and simulate optimal decisions for any situation. Thus, similar to Section 4.1, long-
term price paths with multiple shocks can be calculated. The question we want to
8Remember that p̂1 is the optimal price if ignoring period 2.
9Inducing momentum by rising p1 creates utility in period 2 if λ > 0. But the eect gets smaller
for high p1 as M will have falling marginal demand in period 2 due to risk aversion.
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state here is whether dynamic optimization will have an inuence on the qualitative
nature of the price path, especially on excess volatility. It is clear that there is excess
volatility in both cases, dynamic and non-strategic trading, but we want to show that
it is even increased by dynamic trading. Therefore we randomly chose 20 vectors
of fundamental shocks with a length of 80 time periods each, and simulated price
paths for both non-strategic and strategic trading for dierent λ's between 0 and
3. This allowed us to compare price paths of both cases within the same external
environment. We then checked the standard deviations of the divergence of actual
from fundamental price for both cases as a measure of excess volatility V :
VN ≡ σ(|pt − p∗t |) (excess volatility without strategic trading),
VD ≡ σ(|p̃t − p∗t |) (excess volatility with dynamic optimization).
The mean excess volatility of the 20 runs is shown in Figure 4.5 for the dynamic
and for the non-strategic case. Clearly, excess volatility is much higher for the dynamic
optimization case regardless of the momentum intensity. Thus, the introduction of
a higher grade of rationality for the sophisticated traders in the presence of other,
boundedly rational, traders increases the divergence of prices from their fundamental
value.
Obviously, more rationality in this case increases the mispricing eects. This is
an interesting nding as it contradicts the rst idea that, due to arbitrage, mispricing
should be the lower the higher the degree of rationality is in the market. This does
not seem to hold in cases where the rational agents even reinforce the non-optimal
behavior of other, less rational, actors. The reason in our case is straightforward:
As sophisticated traders benet from higher mispricing, they have an incentive to
amplify price deviations by engaging in strategic trading.
Thus, when dealing with heterogeneous agents, one cannot simply assume a
"monotone relationship" between the "degree" of rationality and the proximity of
the outcome to a rational benchmark.
For both cases, excess volatility is increasing in λ, suggesting more volatile markets
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Figure 4.5: Standard deviation of price deviations dependent on λ for
non-strategic and strategic trading.
if inexperienced traders put a high weight on momentum observations. In a more
realistic setting, it should be discriminated between changes in individual demand of
the members of a given generation of traders and changes in its population size, as
both aect the total demand of that generation. In real markets this would mean
that volatility should rise if more "inexperienced" traders are entering the market or if
experienced traders start to exploit them more strongly. Volatility thus could reect
not only the frequency of new information but also the composition of the market
participants. This could be an interesting point for further empirical research. In our
opinion it also ts the anecdotal evidence that both stock markets grew more volatile,
and - by easier access to nancial markets - investing in stock became more popular
among formerly inexperienced investors in the late 1990s.
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4.5 Conclusion
In Chapter 4 the basic model of Chapter 3 was expanded to a multi-shock case and
to strategic behavior of some market participants. We showed that a more realistic
multi-shock environment preserves bubble formation and adds complexity to the price
path as bubbles overlap and interfere. This makes the market entrance timing of a
trader especially important for overall life-cycle performance.
Introducing strategic behavior of the rational traders led to an even more sophis-
ticated formation of price paths. Although basic features like bubble-formation and
over- and underpricing persist in principle, prices are heavily inuenced by strategic
decisions. Two contradicting eects play a role in this case, namely short and long
term gains that can be made by rational and strategically acting agents. The actual
price path depends on the power of rational agents to also behave dynamically, as
well as on the importance non-rational traders ascribe to momentum observations.
With the help of simulations we showed that excess volatility is always increasing
in markets where rational traders interact strategically with bounded rational agents,
compared to markets where they have no capabilities or no market power to do so.
4.6 Outlook and Testable Implications
On the theoretical side there are many possible and interesting extensions to the
models of Chapters 3 and 4.10 For example it would be desirable to endogenize the
learning process. From psychological research it is known that positive feedback leads
to the enforcement of certain actions. One could include this nding by increasing
the impact of momentum observations on the nal decision if they resulted in good
predictions for several times, and vice versa. Another point would be to allow for
entry and exit decisions in the market.
All these extensions would certainly be interesting, but on the other hand all of
them bring the danger of intractability of the model with them.
10This Outlook refers to Chapter 3 as well as to Chapter 4.
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Rather, as suggested by the Hong/Stein criteria in Section 3.1.1, one could take
a look at testable implications that are made by our model and that go beyond the
already observed phenomena. Especially suited for that would be the results of the
portfolio dynamics. As there is little empirical research in this area so far, one could
test whether the correlation between experience and asset ownership at market peaks
and lows holds true. The most severe problem one is facing when addressing this
question would be the notion of experience. From a practical point of view, there is
hardly any variable that directly observes "experience". One proxy could be portfolio
age or the "knowledge statements" customers have to make when opening portfolio
accounts ("Depots") at German banks.
Another approach would simply assume newcomers to the market as "inexperi-
enced". Therefore, one could observe the correlation of newly opened accounts and
the proximity of prices to a local price peak. In this case, our model would suggest
that a high number of account openings (as it is correlated with high demand of in-
experienced traders) would indicate that prices will soon reach a peak and vice versa.
A stylized hint in that direction is a report on equity ownership in Switzerland by
the Swiss Banking Institute at the University of Zürich (Cocca and Volkart 2002).
It states that the number of small shareholders drastically increased in Switzerland
during the end of the 1990s (during rising prices and close to the price peak in 2000)
and fell again during the period from 2000 to 2002 (during falling prices). In fact the
number of newcomers developed proportionally to changes of the Swiss Market Index
(SMI) in the observed period from 1995 to 2002.
However, a sound econometric check and closer investigation of the stated inter-
relations is still outstanding and could be the subject of a separate work. There, one
could also test a lter strategy that buys assets if the number of newcomers is low
and sells short if it is high, and check whether it would beat a simple buy and hold
strategy in the long run.
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Epilogue
In this dissertation we explored the notion of learning in economics from two
dierent approaches.
The rst part presented a model in the eld of political economy that uses standard
economic learning methodology in a game theoretic context. Learning takes place
via information accumulation and all information is processed optimally in a perfect
rational way. The ndings are then checked in a cross-country empirical study.
The second part introduces a dierent type of "learning", namely learning as a
process of improving decision making strategies. The suggested methodology is ap-
plied to a nancial markets model using elements from the discipline of behavioral
economics. An extension of the model introduces additional rationality to some of
the traders in the model and explores more complicated price paths using numerical
simulations.
These two approaches are quite dierent in nature, in particular with respect to
the degree of rationality they impose on the interacting agents, and both clearly have
their advantages and their downsides. In any case we think that there is still a lot
of interesting work do be done in the eld of learning and economics. Especially
learning in behavioral-economic environments, and more precisely the mentioned no-
tion of learning as a process of improving decision strategies still seems to be very
unexplored. We hope that our work is able to add fruitfully to this exciting branch
of study and we are curious which way learning theories will take in future economic
research.
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A Technical Appendix of Chapter 1
In the technical appendix we want to vary the model in so far as we replace the
uniform output distribution by a normal one, such that e ∼ N(µ, σ). In our opinion
this has three advantages:
1. A normally distributed output seems to be more realistic than the quite unnat-
ural edge knifed uniform distribution.
2. Voters' beliefs can be derived for every outcome e.
3. There are no regions where citizens can infer the type of the incumbent with
certainty from observing e, hence there is no perfect learning.
The stability of the economy is then expressed by the standard deviation σ and the
drift by µ. Citizens form beliefs according to equation 1.6 but the probabilities now
stem from the Gaussian density function for normally distributed random variables
fl,ẽ(e) =
1
ẽ
√
2π
e−
(e−d−l)2
2σ2 (A.1)
where l can be l or l depending on the choice of the incumbent. So there are two
possible distributions of economic outcome, depicted in Figure 4.6.
For the equilibrium choice of I this leads to the two conditions
∫ +∞
−∞
fl,ẽ(e)(fl,ẽ(e)− fl,ẽ(e))
fl,ẽ(e) + fl,ẽ(e)
de >
abl
δ(u0 + abl)
(A.2)
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Figure 4.6: Output levels for low and high variance
for ẽ = e and ẽ = e, respectively, and f(·) being the distributions with the gaussian
form of equation A.1.
To proof Proposition 1.4 with normal distributed density functions, one has to com-
pare the left hand sides of equation A.2 for ẽ = e and ẽ = e. If the left hand side of
(A.2) is smaller for ẽ = e than for ẽ = e, the proof would go through.
Unfortunately we are running into mathematical diculties at this point, because
there does not exist any closed form solution for the integral in equation A.2. Until
now we did not even nd any qualitative statement on comparison between two inte-
grals of this type with dierent standard deviation values in the gaussian functions.
One way to approach this problem is by numerical integration. At least there ex-
ists some quite ecient algorithms for that, and we did many sample calculations
which conrmed our guess that Proposition 1.4 holds true even with norm distributed
shocks.
But also a proof for the validity of Proposition 1.4 can be given when looking at
the behavior of the components in equation A.2 :
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The integral in equation A.2 consists of the citizens belief βI(e) and the probability
p(x = e|l = l1) that output e occurs when I chose l1 and the standard deviation of
shock s is ẽ. Thus, the integrand in equation A.2 can also be written as
fl,ẽ(e)
fl,ẽ(e) + fl,ẽ(e)
· (fl,ẽ(e)− fl,ẽ(e)). (A.3)
The rst factor of expression (A.3) is citizens' beliefs when observing e and the second
factor is the dierence between the probabilities that this outcome occurs when the
choice is l1 = l or l1 = l.
When looking at Figure 4.6, things get clear quickly:
The rst factor is the doted sigmoid-shaped line at the top, citizens' beliefs βI(e).
The second factor is the dierence between the right Gaussian curve (l1 = 0) and
the left one (l1 = l). Thus expression A.3 gives us the marginal contribution to the
integral for every e, depicted by the s-shaped light line around the abscissa.
Therefore the integral value we are searching is the integral over this s-shaped
function. The areas between the Gaussian curves on the left and on the right of their
intersection have the same absolute value, but their contribution to the searched
integral is negative on the left side and positive on the right side.
Because the beliefs-curve is upward sloping and always has the value 0.5 for the
e∗ where the gaussian curves intersect, the integral is positive in any case because
positive contributions right of e∗ are weighted with an higher βI(e) than negative
ones left of e∗.
Now comparing for two dierent σ (a small σ in the left picture of Figure 4.6 and
a bigger one on the right side) yields a "atter" curve βI(e), leading to a smaller
dierence between positive and negative contributions to the integral, and therefore
to a lower positive integral value.11
This shows us that the condition for the choice of high corruption changes with the
11In the extreme case of σ →∞ the βI(e) curve gets horizontal and the integral value of equation
A.2 converges to 0, meaning that there would be no chance for learning in this case. On the other
hand, the simplied case with a discrete distribution of e leads to a step function instead of the
former sigmoid and opens the possibility for perfect learning.
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variance of output even in the normally distributed case and therefore a modied
Proposition 1.4 holds true for this case as well .
2
B Data used in Chapter 2
Appendix B.1
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
d 75 2.4044 2.9059 -5.12 12.28
σ 75 4.1850 2.4027 1.16 11.74
dem95 68 0.7179 0.3143 0 1
ethno 72 40.4444 30.6552 0 93
gdp/capita 75 9.6453 8.2246 0.4 29
cpi03 75 4.8320 2.5841 1.3 9.7
protestant 75 15.0000 24.1056 0 98
formerUK 75 0.3333 0.4746 0 1
federal 75 0.2400 0.4300 0 1
import 75 40.1533 21.9266 10 144
absgovwage 59 19.1792 14.5402 0 52.07
inv 74 17.4095 7.9775 2.8 44.1
school 62 32.2790 15.6746 2.1 64.5
d is the average growth rate in percent per year derived from the GDP data of 1981-2000. σ is the
standard deviation of GDP per capita changes over the period 1981-2000. dem95 is the democracy
level of Barro and ranges from 0 to 1. ethno is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index calculated
by Taylor and Hudson (1972). gdp/cap is in thousands of 1990 US$. gdpabs is GDP in billions of
US$. cpi03 is the corruption perception index 2003 of Transparency International. protestant is
the fraction of protestants in the population in percent. formerUK and federal are dummies for
former colonies of the UK respectively federal constitution. import is the percentage of GDP spent
on the import of goods and services. absgovwage is the wage of central government members in
1990 US$. inv is the investment level as percentage of GDP and school is the percentage of age 15+
population in secondary school from the Barro and Lee dataset on education.
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Appendix B.2
Data Set of Regression Variables
country d std dem95 ethno gdp/cap gdpabs
Angola 3.668647 11.7421 - 78 1.3 16.25
Argentina 0.414388 5.301465 0.83 31 8.7 321.9
Australia 2.1528 1.953665 1 32 22.5 429.75
Austria 1.891073 1.162035 1 13 20.3 164.43
Bangladesh 2.030003 2.610786 0.67 - 0.8 104.8
Belgium 1.833931 1.637082 1 55 20.8 212.16
Bolivia 6.05724 5.498568 0.83 68 2 16.6
Brazil 0.5845485 3.837873 0.83 7 5.4 920.16
Bulgaria -1.092954 4.604136 - 22 4.9 39.69
Cameroon 8.781563 9.81523 0 89 1.9 28.12
Canada 1.266046 2.301653 1 75 21.5 660.05
Chili 3.297317 3.593675 0.83 14 10 152
China 6.000757 2.549945 0 12 3.3 4154.04
Colombia 1.062256 2.323413 0.5 6 5.1 215.73
Costa Rica 7.055356 4.602744 1 7 4.5 17.1
Cote d'Ivoire -1.820095 4.306516 0.17 86 1.3 20.8
Czechoslovakia 0.3917099 3.772114 - 49 8.3 84.66
Denmark 1.799087 1.733895 1 5 22.6 119.78
Ecuador 8.691887 8.577851 0.83 53 3.4 42.84
Egypt 2.261722 2.467418 0.17 4 2.3 146.97
El Salvador 5.979866 5.669881 0.67 17 2.2 13.64
Ethiopia -0.310774 5.402407 - 69 0.4 25.72
Finland 2.267659 3.247875 1 16 20.2 103.02
France 1.48439 1.186892 1 26 20.9 1262.36
Germany 1.069392 1.940835 1 3 19.6 1609.16
Ghana 0.255004 3.747614 0.5 71 1.2 23.16
Greece 1.308161 1.723619 1 10 12.4 130.2
Hong Kong 3.70609 4.308868 0.5 2 19.9 135.32
Hungary 0.4738664 3.960162 1 10 7.4 74
Iceland 9.750859 6.056682 1 5 16.3 4.89
India 3.538195 2.139576 0.5 89 1.7 1727.03
Indonesia 2.720531 5.21032 0 76 2.9 610.16
Ireland 4.424461 3.228451 1 4 22.5 85.5
Israel 2.126658 1.903301 1 20 15.9 98.57999
Italy 1.819667 1.24767 1 4 19 1096.3
Japan 2.376623 1.844005 1 1 21 2664.9
Jordan 0.1779534 6.368637 0.5 5 3.9 18.72
Kenya 0.1474363 2.467789 0 83 1 30
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Appendix B.2
(continued)
country d std dem95 ethno gdp/cap gdpabs
Malawi 6.305225 5.835564 0.83 62 0.8 8.240001
Malaysia 4.156632 4.29536 0.5 72 7.6 177.08
Mauritius 12.28696 11.38317 1 58 13.6 16.32
Mexico 0.8377932 3.9072 0.5 30 7.1 690.12
Morocco 1.238629 5.537662 0.83 53 2.6 74.62
Mozambique 1.940766 6.068113 0.67 65 1 17.7
Netherlands 1.784806 1.511709 1 10 21.6 343.44
New Zealand 1.224276 2.330066 1 37 16.1 61.18
Nigeria -0.990823 5.06873 0.67 87 1.1 139.59
Norway 2.569371 1.833916 1 4 24.6 110.7
Pakistan 2.966282 2.209594 0.67 64 1.9 262.2
Peru -0.52948 6.643544 0.33 59 3.5 89.6
Phillippines 0.0196937 3.810104 0.83 74 2.2 166.1
Poland 0.8828765 4.8146 1 3 7.3 281.78
Portugal 2.804577 2.439595 1 1 14.1 141
Romania -1.693916 4.953649 - 25 2.8 62.72
Russian Fed -5.123297 5.644782 0.83 67 4.2 611.1
Senegal 6.390859 5.357937 0.5 72 1.6 15.2
Singapore 4.697622 3.618259 0.33 42 20.6 82.4
Slovakia 0.3023805 7.361535 - - 8.2 44.28
Slovenia 1.492601 4.998516 - - 10 19
South Africa -0.45202 2.655323 1 88 3.9 166.92
South Korea 5.869474 4.618611 0.83 0 14.3 676.39
Spain 2.270371 1.867589 1 44 15.6 622.4401
Sweden 1.44678 1.928909 1 8 20.5 180.4
Switzerland 0.8746802 1.781698 1 50 22.4 154.56
Taiwan 5.186961 3.14886 0.67 42 16 347.2
Tanzania -0.77957 2.053903 0.33 93 0.5 16.8
Thailand 4.775988 5.08657 0.67 66 6.1 370.27
Turkey 2.011876 4.260743 0.33 25 6 400.8
U.K. 1.924614 2.012159 1 32 20.1 1199.97
U.S.A 2.048953 2.028342 1 50 29 7986.6
Uganda 5.570895 10.94385 0.33 90 1 22.2
Venezuela -1.380581 4.73807 0.67 11 8 192.8
Yugoslavia -0.59366 6.07158 0.17 75 4.8 114.24
Zambia 2.247136 7.311326 0.67 82 0.7 7
Zimbabwe 6.101107 7.693857 0.33 54 2.7 34.02
Empty cells represent missing values. For description of variables see page 95.
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Appendix B.2
(continued)
country cpi03 pro-
tes-
tant
former
UK
fede-
ral
import abs-
gov-
wage
inv school
Angola 1.8 20 0 0 53 - 7 -
Argentina 2.5 3 0 1 11 20.88 15.8 29
Australia 8.8 24 1 1 21 29.25 23.3 52.9
Austria 8 7 0 1 43 20.3 25.1 59.2
Bangladesh 1.3 0 1 0 18 3.28 10.4 14.2
Belgium 7.6 0 0 1 92 49.92 22.1 39
Bolivia 2.3 2 0 0 30 6.8 8.4 18.5
Brazil 3.9 4 0 1 10 - 18 11
Bulgaria 3.9 0 0 0 54 6.86 5 -
Cameroon 1.8 18 0 0 33 7.03 8 12.4
Canada 8.7 30 1 1 39 36.55 24.1 36.2
Chili 7.4 2 0 0 31 42 17.3 33.7
China 3.4 0 0 0 23 4.29 19.2 39.5
Colombia 3.7 1 0 0 24 12.24 11.8 24.3
Costa Rica 4.3 6 0 0 48 0 15.3 16.7
Cote d'Ivoire 2.1 5 0 0 53 9.88 5.7 -
Czechoslovakia 3.9 5 0 0 55 - 22.1 -
Denmark 9.5 95 0 0 46 29.38 21.3 48.4
Ecuador 2.2 2 0 0 33 6.46 16.5 23.3
Egypt 3.3 0 1 0 38 10.81 7.4 25.5
El Salvador 3.7 2 0 0 37 7.92 7.1 10.4
Ethiopia 2.5 2 0 0 31 - 4.2 -
Finland 9.7 93 0 0 36 26.26 24.3 41.5
France 6.9 2 0 0 31 20.9 23.8 35.4
Germany 7.7 46 0 1 27 25.48 23.1 64.5
Ghana 3.3 26 1 0 39 4.8 6.1 25.7
Greece 4.3 0 0 0 29 52.08 21.1 33.8
Hong Kong 8 8 1 0 79 - 25.3 48.8
Hungary 4.8 22 0 0 40 4.44 18.4 36.1
Iceland 9.6 97 0 0 41 - 23.7 39.6
India 2.8 1 1 1 15 6.8 11.9 20.8
Indonesia 1.9 5 0 0 28 4.64 16.8 20.6
Ireland 7.5 1 1 0 76 27 19.7 47.4
Israel 7 0 1 0 44 27.03 25 44.2
Italy 5.3 0 0 0 25 26.6 21.8 39.6
Japan 7 1 0 0 10 - 31.6 48.8
Jordan 4.6 0 1 0 78 10.53 15.6 29.9
Kenya 1.9 19 1 0 41 6.2 8.3 13.5
98
Appendix
Appendix B.2
(continued)
country cpi03 pro-
tes-
tant
former
UK
fede-
ral
import abs-
gov-
wage
inv school
Malawi 2.8 32 1 0 49 - 9.2 4.1
Malaysia 5.2 1 1 1 99 25.84 24.4 31.1
Mauritius 4.4 1 1 0 70 19.04 8.5 36
Mexico 3.6 1 0 1 23 - 18.1 30.5
Morocco 3.3 0 0 0 32 11.7 12.7 -
Mozambique 2.7 22 0 0 44 - 3.1 2.1
Netherlands 8.9 42 0 0 55 43.2 22.1 51.3
New Zealand 9.5 38 1 0 36 51.52 21.2 38.9
Nigeria 1.4 16 1 1 36 - 8.3 -
Norway 8.8 98 0 0 42 27.06 29.3 60.6
Pakistan 2.5 1 1 1 25 3.61 11.3 21.8
Peru 3.7 3 0 0 18 - 18 30.7
Philippines 2.5 4 0 0 43 5.06 15 33.1
Poland 3.6 0 0 0 28 - 19.9 46.7
Portugal 6.6 1 0 0 35 22.56 21.9 20.7
Romania 2.8 6 0 0 26 2.52 21.9 -
Russian Fed 2.7 0 0 1 16 1.26 17.3 -
Senegal 3.2 0 0 0 45 18.88 6.5 6.9
Singapore 9.4 4 1 0 144 43.26 44.1 36.3
Slovakia 3.7 8 0 0 69 8.2 23.8 -
Slovenia 5.9 5 0 0 63 - 21.8 -
South Africa 4.5 39 1 0 25 21.84 9.5 29.3
South Korea 4.3 12 0 0 32 45.76 34 55.6
Spain 6.9 0 0 1 25 28.08 23.4 32.4
Sweden 9.3 68 0 0 41 16.4 20.5 52.8
Switzerland 8.8 43 0 1 39 33.6 26.3 58
Taiwan 5.7 3 0 0 48 - 19.2 43.4
Tanzania 2.5 11 1 0 61 0.9 18.9 2.2
Thailand 3.3 0 0 0 48 25.62 31.3 12.1
Turkey 3.1 0 0 0 23 12 16.9 17.9
U.K. 8.7 16 1 0 37 30.15 17.9 41.4
U.S.A 7.5 44 1 1 14 43.5 20.6 53
Uganda 2.2 2 1 0 22.5 8.4 2.8 10.6
Venezuela 2.4 1 0 1 27 14.4 14.4 28.8
Yugoslavia 2.3 1 0 1 20 - - 28.6
Zambia 2.5 32 1 0 46 2.24 9.5 -
Zimbabwe 2.3 21 1 0 43 18.36 13.1 -
Empty cells represent missing values. For description of variables see page 95.
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C Appendix of Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Equation 3.29 - ∆bit
Let π+ and π− denote the new π-values for the case that the received signal st was
correct and z changed from zt−1 = 0 to zt = st. ∆π be the absolute change in π
which is equal for an increase and a decrease in z if zt−1 was zero. Note that
bit−1 = πt−1.
Generation i's belief is then
bit =
i− 1
n− 1(τπ
+ + (1− τ)π−) + n− i
n− 1πt−1 (C.1)
= πt−1 +
i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1). (C.2)
Hence,
∆bit = bit − πt−1 = i− 1
n− 1∆π(2τ − 1). (C.3)
2
D Appendix of Chapter 4
D.1 Optimization problem of myopic exploiting rational
agents
The optimization problem is thus12
max
p
−bRe−ρ(rW−
1
ρyh
ln(
yh
rp
−1)(yh−p)) − (1− bR)e−ρ(rW+
1
ρyh
ln(
yh
rp
−1)p)
. (D.1)
The marginal expected utility in period one after stable prices for two periods
12Note that we are in the rst period after a shock, and thus bM = 12 .
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(p0 = p−1) is:
∂EU1(p1)
∂p1
=
bR1
( yh − p1
rp21(
yh
rp1
− 1) +
1
yh
ln(
yh
rp1
− 1)
)
e
−ρrW− 1
yh
ln(
yh
rp1
−1)(yh−p1)
+ (1− bR1)
(
− 1
rp1(
yh
rp1
− 1) +
1
yh
ln(
yh
rp1
− 1)
)
e
−ρrW+ 1
yh
ln(
yh
rp1
−1)p1 , (D.2)
where
bR1 = τ
1
e−s1 + 1
+ (1− τ) 1
es1 + 1
.
Setting equation D.2 to zero and solving for p1 yields the optimal price and thus the
optimal demand of the myopic exploiting rational traders.
D.2 Optimization problem of dynamic exploiting rational
agents
From an ex ante perspective (uncertainty about rst period z1), the second period
expected utility dependent on p1 is:
EU2(p1) = τ(bR2U∗(s1, yh) + (1− bR2)U∗(s1, 0))
+ (1− τ)(bR2U∗(−s1, yh) + (1− bR2)U∗(−st, 0)), (D.3)
where U∗(c, d) is the myopic maximized utility when z1 = c and y2 = yh. For
example U∗(−s1, yh) is the maximal possible utility of generation R if it exploits
M, the signal was wrong (z1 = −s1) and the risky asset A yields high payo at the
end of period 2 (y2 = yh).
Therefore,
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∂EU2(p1)
∂p1
=
rτp2(1− bM2(p1))
yhbM2(p1)(yh − rp2)
·
(b′M2(p1)(yh − rp2)
(1− bM2(p1))rp2
+
bM2(p1)(yh − rp2)b
′
M2(p1)
(1− bM2(p1))2rp2
)
·
[
−bR2(yh−p2)e
−ρrW− 1
yh
ln
bM2(p1)(yh−rp2)
(1−bM2(p1))rp2
(yh−p2) +(1−bR2)p2e
−ρrW+ 1
yh
ln
bM2(p1)(yh−rp2)
(1−bM2(p1))rp2
p2
]
− (1− τ)rp2(1− bM2(p1))
yhbM2(p1)(yh − rp2)
·
(b′M2(p1)(yh − rp2)
(1− bM2(p1))rp2
+
bM2(p1)(yh − rp2)b
′
M2(p1)
(1− bM2(p1))2rp2
)
·
[
bR2(yh−p2)e
−ρrW− 1
yh
ln
bM2(p1)(yh−rp2)
(1−bM2(p1))rp2
(yh−p2)+(1−bR2)p2e
−ρrW+ 1
yh
ln
bM2(p1)(yh−rp2)
(1−bM2(p1))rp2
p
2
]
,
(D.4)
where
bM2(p1) ≡ 1
e−s1−λ(p1−p0) + 1
(bM2 dependent on p1 if s1 was right),
bM2(p1) ≡
1
e+s1−λ(p1−p0) + 1
(bM2 dependent on p1 if s1 was wrong),
b
′
M2(p1) =
λe−s1−λ(p1−p0)
(e−s1−λ(p1−p0) + 1)2
,
b′M2(p1) =
λe+s1−λ(p1−p0)
(e+s1−λ(p1−p0) + 1)2
,
p2 ≡ argmaxp2EU2(p2|p1, s1 = +∆z1) (optimal p2 if s1 was right) ,
p
2
≡ argmaxp2EU2(p2|p1, s1 = −∆z1) (optimal p2 if s1 was wrong) ,
bR2 ≡ 1
e( − s1) + 1 (bR2 if s1 was right),
bR2 ≡
1
e( + s1) + 1
(bR2 if s1 was wrong).
In the square brackets of the main equation you can nd the utilities of the four
possible end states again.
Setting equation D.4 to zero and solving for p1 yields the optimal price and thus the
optimal demand of the dynamic exploiting rational traders.
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